CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 13 June 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 508th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order. Hereby, we begin the second part of the 1989 session of the Conference. There is no doubt that in this second part we will be able to benefit from some recent developments that may lead to an improvement in relations between the countries of East and West, particularly the Soviet Union and the United States.

The programme of work we have adopted contains various items: the prohibition of all nuclear tests; cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of an arms race in outer space; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; elimination of chemical weapons; the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament; the conclusion of international arrangements to ensure that no one uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons against States that have no such weapons; radiological weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction.

In this brief statement, I should like to confine myself to a few words on three of those items: the prohibition of all nuclear tests, the elimination of chemical weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the last resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the first of these items, it was stressed that on eight different occasions the Assembly has condemned such tests in the strongest terms, stating its conviction that the continuance of such tests will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war. The Assembly also pointed out that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration in 1985, called upon all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, as a matter of the highest priority, in this Conference on Disarmament.

In respect of the second of the items I mentioned above, that is the elimination of chemical weapons, we should bear in mind the importance of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, which met in Paris from 7 to 11 January of the current year under the chairmanship of M. Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. Mexico, which became a party to this Protocol without reservations in 1932, welcomed with satisfaction the provisions of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, and along with all the participating States stressed "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction", and to that end called on the Conference on Disarmament to "redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". The convention, as we have already said, will represent no threat to the security of any State; rather, it will strengthen the security of one and all.

The third and the last of the items which, as I said at the beginning, I shall be referring to on this occasion very briefly, is that of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which this Conference has been dealing with since 1980 through an Ad hoc Committee in which I have had the honour to occupy the chair since 1981. In the statement I made at the opening meeting of the session of the Conference for the current year on 7 February 1989, one

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may examine the many sections of the programme which have already been adopted by consensus. These confirm the well-founded conclusion reached by the Ad hoc Committee dealing with the programme last year, which is summed up in the report which the Committee submitted to the General Assembly, in the following terms:

> "Bearing in mind the terms of its mandate, the Ad hoc Committee agreed that it should resume work at the outset of the 1989 session with a firm intention of completing the elaboration of the programme for its submission to the General Assembly, at the latest, at its forty-fourth session."

I think I faithfully interpret the opinion of the members of the Conference in expressing my hope that the intention of the Ad hoc Committee as summed up in the conclusion I have just quoted will become reality. Of course, as far as I am concerned, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee dealing with that item, you may be certain that I will do my very utmost to achieve that.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Sweden, Brazil, Morocco and Australia. I shall first call on the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, it is with particular satisfaction that my delegation sees you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament during the month of June. I am pleased to greet you as the dean of the international disarmament community. I should also mention the long and traditional co-operation between Mexico and Sweden in the field of disarmament, in recognition of which you and Mrs. Alva Myrdal were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

At the same time, I wish to express my sincere thanks to your predecessor as President, Ambassador Bullut of Kenya, for the effective way in which he presided over the Conference at the end of its spring session. I extend a warm welcome to the new colleagues who have taken up their functions in the CD since I last had the opportunity to address the Conference - Ambassador Ait-Chaalal of Algeria, Ambassador Vajnar of Czechoslovakia and Mr. Batsanov, the new head of the delegation of the Soviet Union. My delegation looks forward to co-operating with you, distinguished new colleagues.

For ages, man has nourished the vain hope of finally waging the war to end all wars. Even the well-known inventor and industrialist, Alfred Nobel, had this unrealistic idea. He declared that he would like to invent a substance or a machine with such terrible power of mass destruction that war would be made impossible for ever.

Today man has come to realize that as the destructive potential approaches infinity, security approaches zero. We have come to realize that, as unanimously declared by the first special session on disarmament, the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more of a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. We have unanimously concluded that the time has therefore come to put an end to this situation, and to seek security in disarmament.

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A contemporary scholar has remarked that "the arms race is a system based on faith, faith that human nature works in the way that deterrence theorists say it does, faith that deterrence itself should be credited with preventing war." This faith is now crumbling. As this faith loses its grip on our perceptions and minds, the arms race is slowly beginning to lose its momentum.

In the nuclear age, nations cannot attain security at each other's expense. They must find security together. This idea of common security was launched at the beginning of the 1980s by the Palme Commission. The former United States Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, recently pointed out that the two super-Powers now in practice subscribe to this idea. At last, nations appear to have realized that in order to attain peace, we must not prepare for war, but prepare for peace.

The first nuclear disarmament agreement ever, the INF Treaty, is being implemented. Gradually a whole category of nuclear missiles is being eliminated. In a few days the United States and the Soviet Union are to resume their bilateral Nuclear and Space Talks here in Geneva. Considerable progress had already been made in the earlier phases of the negotiations on reductions of their strategic offensive weapons. An agreement leading to significant nuclear disarmament would be yet another sign that dialogue and understanding are replacing military competition and political confrontation in international relations.

There is ample room for unilateral disarmament initiatives by the major military Powers, as evidenced in the reduction measures first announced by General Secretary Gorbachev. In the European context, both East and West have taken significant initiatives in recent months. In the twin European negotiations in Vienna aiming at further confidence-building and lower levels of conventional armaments, both sides have presented comprehensive proposals.

Sweden welcomes the recent initiative by President Bush, adopted by the Western alliance, for conventional arms reductions in Europe. My Government also notes with great satisfaction the ambition of the United States President to accelerate the Vienna negotiations on conventional force reductions in order to reach agreement within a year. As it has long been Sweden's position that all categories of nuclear weapons ought to be subject to disarmament negotiations, my Government further welcomes the fact that there now also seem to be prospects of East-West negotiations on reducing short-range nuclear forces in the not too distant future.

There is growing recognition of the fact that the use of nuclear weapons would be deeply reprehensible. One may actually speak of an international norm, an unwritten law, which is gradually gaining acceptance. The major nuclear-weapon States themselves have contributed to the process of delegitimizing nuclear weapons: not only their use, but ultimately also the very possession of nuclear weapons.

In article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 the nuclear-weapon States undertook "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". The United States and the Soviet Union, furthermore, in their

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joint announcement on 8 January 1985 of their agreement to commence negotiations on space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, declared that ultimately these negotiations "should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere". The most eloquent expression of this emerging norm is the solemn declaration by the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva in 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".

The prevailing sentiment of people all over the world since the first nuclear bomb exploded over Hiroshima almost 44 years ago is thus gradually becoming an accepted moral guideline for sovereign nation States. The Governments of the other nuclear-weapon States ought now to follow the example of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union and confirm that a nuclear war must never be fought and that nuclear weapons should be completely eliminated everywhere.

Further, those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such undertakings should be facilitated by a positive outcome of the unilateral and negotiated efforts to adjust conventional asymmetries and to reduce levels of conventional armaments. Such declarations would be in conformity with mankind's moral reprobation of the use of nuclear weapons, and would de facto amount to a reciprocal prohibition against the use of such weapons. This declaratory non-first-use policy should then be corroborated by a legally binding international instrument laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

However, would not any use of nuclear weapons violate the dictates of public conscience? Would not any use of nuclear weapons be in contravention of fundamental principles of humanitarian law of armed conflict? The time has come to examine how this unwritten rule could be translated into binding treaty law.

A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, to be adhered to by all States, is now more imperative than ever. It is true that in recent years the international situation has seen important changes. The relationship between the two super-Powers has improved, and progress has been made in arms limitation and disarmament measures. Yet nuclear testing continues.

In 1988, 38 nuclear explosions were recorded. China carried out 1, France 8, the United States 12, and the Soviet Union 17. Their main purpose is the further modernization of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States offer a multitude of technical reasons and political excuses to justify the unjustifiable. The overwhelming majority of States do not accept, and have never accepted, the reasons given. They question the legitimacy of continued nuclear testing. They do not accept that the Soviet Union and United States merely gauge the yield of each other's continuing nuclear tests. What they do demand is international verification that no nuclear tests whatsoever take place. And what they do demand is a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The latest expression of the widespread concern about the urgency of a total nuclear test ban is the initiative to convene a conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty to convert it into a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

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Sweden hopes that the international pressure will at last catalyse agreement on starting negotiations, already long overdue, on a comprehensive test-ban treaty here in the Conference on Disarmament.

After years of frustration at the lack of progress with the test ban item, we see some hopeful signs that the stalemate could, at last, be overcome. My delegation would like to commend Ambassador Yamada for his efforts to forge a consensus on a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. It is well know that Sweden is in favour of immediate negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. For a long time now, my delegation has been prepared to accept any mandate that advances this item and is acceptable to other delegations. With a little flexibility on all sides, an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban could be established and commence its work this very month.

A year and a half ago, the world community welcomed the INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. It was a breakthrough, which raised great hopes and expectations. Last year, the Treaty was ratified, and the elimination of an entire class of nuclear missiles was initiated.

The twentieth anniversary of the non-proliferation Treaty was almost upon us before we could witness the beginning of the first small instalment of the nuclear-weapon States' commitments to nuclear disarmament, as provided for in article VI of this Treaty. In other words, 20 years had elapsed since the Soviet Union and the United States undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The INF Treaty was the first step. The world cannot wait another 20 years for the next step.

In the 1988 United Nations General Assembly, Sweden took the initiative for a new comprehensive United Nations study on nuclear weapons. The group of governmental experts appointed to conduct the United Nations study held its first session in March this year. Unlike the latest United Nations study, in which no nuclear-weapon State participated, three are taking part in this one: France, the Soviet Union and the United States.

The study has been commissioned to examine past and present technological trends. We will investigate the development, production and testing of nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrines as well as decision-making concerning nuclear weapons. We will look into the risks of further proliferation of nuclear weapons and the importance of preventing it. We will deal with the efforts to reduce nuclear weapons and achieve a comprehensive test ban. We will analyse verification of compliance with disarmament treaties. Finally, our ambition is to produce political recommendations and disarmament proposals. The report is due to be completed in time for the 1990 review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty, and will hopefully have an impact on the review conference.

The non-proliferation Treaty remains the most important multilateral arms limitation agreement so far. It has made a significant contribution to international stability and security. One hundred and forty States have now

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adhered to the NPT. However, a few important countries with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities are still not parties to the Treaty. This situation remains a threat to the effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime. The Swedish Government urges all countries that have not adhered to the Treaty to do so.

Next year, the fourth conference to review the operation of the NPT will be convened. This will be the last review conference before 1995. It is in 1995 that the future of the NPT régime is to be decided. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties have all fulfilled their commitments under the non-proliferation Treaty. For the credibility of the NPT régime and in order to reinforce it, it is imperative that the nuclear-weapon States too now fulfil all their obligations. For the credibility of the NPT régime, the nuclear-weapon States should promptly agree to start negotiating on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. For the credibility of the NPT régime, the fourth review conference must be able to record further significant nuclear disarmament.

The INF Treaty was a breakthrough in several ways. For the first time history, nuclear materials are now being removed from nuclear warheads as a consequence of a disarmament agreement. My Government considers that such materials should not be recycled for weapons purposes. If used for peaceful purposes, they should be subject to IAEA safeguards. Such verification should, in fact, be an integral part of a continuing process towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It is one matter, however, to safeguard fissionable material transferred from nuclear warheads to peaceful uses; it is an entirely different matter to prohibit the production of additional fissionable materials for weapons purposes. For many years, Sweden has urged that such production be prohibited.

My Government welcomes the decision, announced by President Gorbachev last April, that the Soviet Union will this year cease the production of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons purposes, and plans to shut down this year and next year two reactors producing plutonium for weapons, without putting any new reactors into operation. At the same time, we note that the production of plutonium and tritium for weapons has been discontinued in the United States. In Sweden's view, this constitutes a propitious situation for the complete cessation of the production of, and agreed prohibition of, the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Such a cut-off would not only contribute to halting the nuclear arms race, but also facilitate the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. An important step towards and a pre-condition for a verified cut-off is the complete separation of the military and civil nuclear sectors in all the nuclear-weapon States. Sweden therefore urges all States to agree on the complete cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

There is an urgent need for naval disarmament - not least nuclear naval disarmament - and there is a need for maritime confidence-building measures. Sweden supports the suggestion put forward by the Palme Commission two months ago for the prohibition of all sea-borne nuclear weapons other than those

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specifically designated by agreement, as an interim measure in anticipation of comprehensive nuclear disarmament. My Government welcomes the plans of the United States Navy unilaterally to phase out several types of tactical nuclear missiles.

For several years now Sweden has argued that long-range sea-based cruise missiles should be banned; that all tactical nuclear weapons on board warships should be taken ashore and not be on board on routine patrols; that the current laws of sea warfare should be modernized; and that the outdated practice of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board should be abandoned. Just a few weeks ago further deliberations on naval armaments and disarmament took place in the UNDC. On that occasion Sweden introduced two working papers: one concerning a multilateral agreement for the prevention of incidents at sea, and another concerning sea-mines.

Security at sea is a function of the conduct of all States with national navies. It should thus, in Sweden's view, be in the interest of all States, regardless of the size of their navies, to achieve an international régime for the prevention of incidents. The peaceful character of the seas and oceans - common to us all - could be enhanced by strengthening existing international law. Existing bilateral agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea have generally been regarded as useful and successful. It could be worth while to build on the provisions in these agreements in order to create a multilateral code of conduct.

There are several reasons why a number of States see merit in a multilateral agreement. Firstly, the existing bilateral agreements have been concluded between major naval Powers of opposing military alliances. However, the many countries which do not belong to any of the major military alliances also have their concerns. A multilateral agreement could be one way of meeting the security concerns of these countries. Secondly, concluding a multitude of bilateral agreements may create a confusing situation. We should instead endeavour to build a straightforward and transparent system of international norms to be applied in this area. Thirdly, a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea would be an important maritime confidence-building measure and could thus contribute to enhancing not only security at sea, but also international peace and security in general. My Government favours the initiation of negotiations for a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea. As you will recall, we have proposed that the Conference on Disarmament should add this matter to its agenda.

It is my Government's view that a comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons within the near future is absolutely necessary. The risk of the further spread and use of chemical weapons is otherwise going to remain with us for ever. People all over the world are concerned about chemical weapons, and recognize the imperative need to ban them completely. Now it is up to politicians and diplomats to face this challenge.

At the close of the spring session, my delegation gave its detailed views in the plenary on the current stage of the chemical weapons negotiations. I will therefore limit myself to a few basic considerations. The Conference on Disarmament has made considerable progress towards a chemical weapons ban in

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recent years. After the Paris Conference, which underscored the urgency of our task, the machinery set up here in Geneva - under the creative guidance of Ambassador Morel - has taken up important aspects of the challenge before us. But, unfortunately, not enough political commitment has yet been devoted to some of the most problematic issues and key areas. We are, for example, not yet close to solving the difficult questions connected with challenge inspections. We have not made enough progress on the question of the Executive Council; nor on the order of destruction; nor on the effective total prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.

Instead of focusing on these and other crucial problems, much energy has been spent on less urgent issues and also on new and probably less fruitful concepts. This is, of course, not due to anybody's bad intentions. It is simply because a strong enough political commitment has not yet been mobilized. The technicalities will be far from impossible to overcome, once the political commitment is manifested. It is unfortunate that recent positive developments in other areas of disarmament do not yet seem to have reached the area of chemical weapons. If that issue were to be energetically addressed by the two super-Powers, giant steps could be taken within a few months.

The only new initiative in this area is the Canberra Conference. It can make a useful contribution if it increases knowledge within the chemical industry about the implications of the coming convention, and encourages the industry to co-operate in order to implement its provisions. What that Conference must not do is limit our focus to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. That would distract from rather than support the work here in Geneva. The only solution to the threat posed by chemical weapons is a comprehensive convention, and we must make a concerted effort to ensure its speedy conclusion.

There has been a steady improvement in the international political climate in recent years. There has been remarkable progress in the super-Power dialogue. The United Nations has experienced a series of successes in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. At last, nations have come to realize that they cannot attain security at each other's expense. They have to seek security in common. Nations have failed to end all wars by waging war. To attain peace, nations must wage peace.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for her statement and for her kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the next speaker, the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azambuja.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil): Mr. President, my delegation wishes to express very warmly its congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for this month of June, when we initiate our summer session. Brazil and Mexico are not only nations of the same region and the same cultural background, but have always enjoyed extremely friendly bilateral relations, and you, Sir, as a former ambassador to my country, have given a major contribution to that fortunate climate. I will not touch upon your very well-known personal achievements and contributions in the field of disarmament, lest I devote my entire statement to them. You will forgive me

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if I recall early days in Mexico in the 1960s when I, as a junior member of the Brazilian delegation, worked with you in trying to put together the régime to keep Latin America free from nuclear weapons. Your inspired leadership at that time remains to me an example of diplomacy conducted with great skill and with great statesmanship. I wish then, Sir, every success to you as our new President.

I would also like to profit from this occasion to thank our former presidents for the months of April and March for the very good job. I mean Ambassador Simon Bullut of Kenya and my dear friend Ambassador Yamada of Japan. I am also glad to see Mr. Batsanov as the head of the delegation of the Soviet Union to the CD. I hope to have with him the same very fruitful relations I enjoyed with his predecessor, Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin.

The time the CD is devoting to item 4 of its agenda clearly reflects the willingness expressed in the consensus Final Declaration of the Paris Conference to redouble efforts towards the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention. My delegation, by words and deeds, has fully supported this thrust, conscious that a universal and non-discriminatory instrument on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons is an attainable though complex objective, which certainly justifies comprehensive, detailed and intensive negotiations.

Having said that, I must also stress, like others before me, that such a worthy endeavour, such an urgent endeavour, should not, by any token, entail neglect by this body of the totality of its obligations as the sole multilateral forum mandated by the international community to negotiate, with similar determination, different measures and agreements vital to world peace and security. A progressive and ultimately exclusive concentration by this Conference on one area of its work, combined with the gradual abandonment of the remainder, would be in contradiction with its commitment to the cause of general and complete disarmament, to which it is bound not only by the Final Document of the first special session but also by the letter and spirit of many General Assembly resolutions. Bearing this in mind, and firmly convinced that through a meaningful and in-depth search for generally acceptable formulae, this Conference will finally cover, as it must in an appropriate way, the whole spectrum of disarmament questions. I would like to focus now on some aspects of items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of our agenda, which in my opinion require urgent review and action by the CD. This will demand, in some instances, a minimum amount of recapitulation, for which I beg the indulgence of this plenary.

In 1982 the CD established a working group under item 1 of the agenda with a mandate limited to verification and compliance with regard to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The alleged underlying reason for the restrictive character of that exercise was that the then apparent standstill in the negotiations between the super-Powers did not allow for a more structured and broader approach towards a multilaterally negotiated CTBT. The obvious implication was that the degree of involvement of the world community in matters related to its own collective survival was to be dependent on the state of the relationship between the super-Powers.

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The Brazilian delegation did not then, as it does not now, share that perception, and only agreed to work under a mandate derived from its premises on a strictly temporary basis, assuming all the while, as was clearly agreed, that it would soon be revised and consequently upgraded. These expectations, far from being idealistic, were from 1972 onwards concretely based on the various resolutions of the General Assembly stipulating that we should promptly initiate multilateral negotiations on a CTBT. The fact that a consensus decision on these terms was blocked, and that the work done on item 1 of the agenda under those limitations did prove fruitless, indicated as far back as 1983 the evident pointlessness of abiding by the 1982 or other similar mandate any longer.

In subsequent years there have been profound changes in the nature of the negotiations between the super-Powers in their quest for mutually acceptable higher stages of arms control at undiminished levels of security. As part of this process, confidence-building measures have been devised and implemented on an unprecedented scale, and methods for verification of compliance have been refined to a level of detail never before deemed feasible, to the extent that past allegations of the impracticability of a truly verifiable CTB have in fact become unsustainable. It is a matter of record now that this bilateral convergence on disarmament-related issues prompted the successful negotiation of the INF Treaty, which in turn paves the way for a future agreement on 50 per cent reductions in the strategic nuclear forces of the super-Powers. It is also currently assumed that the momentum thus far generated will next lead them to the ratification of the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty and the threshold nuclear test-ban Treaty.

While this joint search by the United States and the Soviet Union for mutually acceptable terms of disarmament appears to be steadily under way, this Conference has yet to begin work on agenda item 1 which is commensurate with its inherent negotiating capacity. The proposals put forward to that end by the Group of 21, as contained in CD/520/Rev.2 and more recently in CD/829, have earned considerable support from a great number of delegations around this table, and forthright approval by the Group of Socialist Countries and China. These proposals have nevertheless failed to reach the necessary consensus, though evidently not on account of a "difficult political climate between the super-Powers", as alleged in the past for the dismissal of similar initiatives. This time it became more apparent that the main reason for failure is the persistence, against all logic and the will of the international community, of a notion that multilateral and bilateral negotiations on a CTB are mutually exclusive, whatever their time frame, and thus that the CD should not exercise its negotiating prerogatives in dealing with its agenda item 1.

Confronted with these circumstances, it was obviously only a question of time before members of the CD started searching for other ways to commence effective multilateral negotiations towards a CTBT. A viable alternative to that end was readily identified in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, more specifically in its second preambular paragraph and the first paragraph of its article II, which

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when taken together pointed to the possibility of transforming it, through an amending conference, into a CTBT. Last year, in what became known as the Six-nation Initiative, Mexico, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Venezuela did present to the original parties to the CTBT an amendment proposal with that objective.

At this point I would like to stress that, as a party without reservations to the Moscow Treaty, Brazil has traditionally supported the idea of converting it into a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban. In 1985, for instance, the Brazilian delegation, in yet another attempt to establish a subsidiary body under item 1 of the agenda, submitted a draft decision to this Conference (CD/602) where it was indicated that "taking into account the need to achieve the full implementation of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, of 1963, the Conference on Disarmament [would decide] to establish an ad hoc committee on item 1 of its agenda, nuclear test ban, in order to fulfil that purpose."

To further detail the position of my country on this matter I will add that in our view the mandate of the amending conference should be strictly in line with the preamble of the Moscow Treaty, which sets the objective of the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".

Our expectations are that the convening of a conference to amend and transform the Moscow Treaty into a CTBT which Brazil would not fail to attend, is not to be interpreted as precluding the chances that the Conference on Disarmament will adequately consider its agenda item 1, a sentiment that we hope can be shared by the sponsors of that initiative. Moreover, my delegation is firmly convinced that work with the same objective in both forums could well be highly complementary as long as the mandate conferred on a subsidiary body dedicated to the consideration of agenda item 1 of the CD conformed with the naturally negotiating basis of a conference to amend the Moscow Treaty.

The same determination with which we should seek consensual terms to begin work on item 1 of our agenda is also required to enable us to overcome recurrent difficulties in dealing with two other "nuclear items" on the agenda, namely cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war including all related matters. While it is widely argued that these items 2 and 3 do require further evaluation before actual negotiations can be pursued with an acceptable margin of success, there has not been a corresponding willingness to establish subsidiary bodies in the CD to begin at least to fill this gap.

As to the other nuclear item on our agenda, on negative security assurances, my delegation has consistently maintained that there can be no effective guarantee against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons while the nuclear-weapon States seem intent on perpetuating their atomic arsenals. This perception has not in any way prevented us from contributing to the current work being done in the Ad hoc Committee under item 6. We feel that there could be a different approach to this question, but we are nevertheless willing to participate in efforts that earnestly aim

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at creating or refining concepts related to it. A similar constructive disposition by all concerned would probably enable the CD to establish subsidiary bodies under items 2 and 3 as well.

Impasses and difficult negotiating situations, although disagreeable, are common circumstances in our trade, which in a way never fails to be enriched by the very exercise of surmounting them. Sometimes, though, these circumstances arise in such an unexpected way that their impact has a mostly disquieting effect, especially when it is generally perceived that all conditions needed to start meaningful work have already been met. One example at hand is what happened in the Ad hoc Committee on outer space during the spring session of the Conference. As we all know, this subsidiary body was established by the CD in pursuance of recommendations of the General Assembly based on the proposition that outer space is to be preserved from the same scourge that plagues other environments of our planet.

We in the CD worked out an adequate mandate so that we could pursue this crucial objective; a suitable programme of work was devised in order to orient these efforts, and it was even agreed that last year's scenario would be changed so as to assure the most convenient acceptable conditions to start our endeavours. The Brazilian delegation, for its part, was ready to work within this context taking into account the principle that the non-militarization of outer space also constitutes an essential pre-condition for the adoption of significant measures for regional disarmament. Many other delegations had also indicated that they too were prepared to expand their views on different aspects of the subject matter. All of this effort was to little avail.

The Ad hoc Committee on item 5 has yet to properly address its agenda because no amount of preliminary discussions have conclusively settled the procedural arguments that in reality mask one basic question: whether the present legal régime applied to outer space is or is not sufficient to prevent an arms race from developing in that environment. The Brazilian delegation has consistently maintained that the present legal régime must be expanded and enhanced if we are to succeed in checking the ongoing threats of the militarization of outer space. At the same time, my delegation is ready to further the debate on any facet of this question with a considerable amount of flexibility. But we will not condone any attempt to prejudge the final work of the Ad hoc Committee, or any other attempt that would lead it to an impasse in contradiction with the basic assumptions under which it was established.

The frankness with which I have tried to express these considerations should be interpreted solely as another effort to be brief and to clarify matters and permit us to pursue our common objective, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Our deep concern is that any initiative to debate the central elements of this matter in other forums might not only indicate an intent to complement the work being done here but also reflect a disappointment with the capacity of the CD to fully discharge its responsibilities.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Morocco, Ambassador Benhima.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President. It is a great pleasure for me to address my heartfelt congratulations to you on taking up the presidency of the Conference. I would also like to pay special tribute to your dedication to the cause of peace and disarmament, for which you have ceaselessly striven for many years and for which you have received the most highly valued token of recognition - the Nobel Peace Prize. Your long experience in the field of disarmament and your skill as a practised negotiator, together with your legendary patience, will, I am sure, give new impetus to your work during the summer session. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome Ambassador Batsanov of the USSR and assure him of the co-operation of my delegation.

This time last year the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was taking place. One of the subjects that was omnipresent in all the statements and underlay all the discussions was that of outer space and the risks of militarization that are threatening it. Last September's issue of the UN Chronicle listed this same subject at the forefront of the six obstacles that prevented a consensus on the closing document.

The concerns of the international community concerning the spread of the arms race to outer space were once again the subject of a lengthy debate at the forty-third regular session of the General Assembly last autumn. Out of the 76 resolutions that the Assembly adopted on disarmament questions, the one on outer space was alone in receiving the votes of all delegations with the exception of one. This near-unanimous support of all Members of the United Nations for resolution 43/70 is the universal expression of the will to work for the achievement of a goal shared by the whole of mankind, that of preventing an arms race in outer space. This resolution does not confine itself to recalling that space is the common heritage of mankind. It also reaffirms that the exploration and use of space must be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. It expresses international concern about the danger that would hover over mankind if there were an arms race in space. In order to grapple with this danger, the resolution calls upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to protect space from the arms race and to promote it as an area for co-operation and use for peaceful purposes. The two main space Powers were also requested to pursue their bilateral negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space. However, what we should bear in mind in this resolution is the primordial role it grants to the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of one or several multilateral agreements on the question. It is a role that arises out of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which states: "In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held".

In order to implement this paragraph, the Conference on Disarmament has had an ad hoc committee since 1985. Unfortunately, and because of the very modest mandate given to it, this body has not been in a position to respond to the expectations of the international community. Far from embarking on a negotiating process on the question of the preventon of an arms race in outer space, its terms limited the scope of the Committee's task to an examination,

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as a first step ... through substantive and general consideration. It is true that these terms were the result of a laboriously negotiated compromise. But it is also true that this compromise was limited in time in so far as the negotiating process was to get under way at a later stage. Five years afterwards, we are obliged to recognize with regret that the terms of the mandate have become immutable, since every attempt to revise them along the lines of paragraph 80 of the Final Document has met with a blunt refusal. Over the years, this has led to the consecration of a status quo which could paralyse a body in which we placed high hopes.

Providing the Ad hoc Committee on outer space with a negotiating mandate is not an end in itself. This mandate constitutes the only path which has been traced for us by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, just as it is the best way of responding to the concerns of the international community. Inspired by all these considerations, the neutral and non-aligned countries tried once again last spring to follow up the resolutions I have referred to. It was our ardent wish to make a reality of the calling of our Conference for negotiation, by proposing an appropriate mandate for this Committee. However, as in previous years, it was not possible to achieve consensus with regard to this objective. The political responsibility that we unanimously shoulder as members of the Conference has encouraged us to persevere in our position of flexibility, without which the Committee would not have seen the light of day. The re-establishment of this subsidiary body gives us some satisfaction, but we nevertheless feel utterly disappointed at the failure to respect the scenario which has presided over the adoption of the mandate in recent years. Moreover, it was our wish that the belated adoption of this mandate would encourage the members of the Conference to embark on the work of the Committee with all due speed. But this was not the case. Quite the contrary, a procedural imbroglio prevented the Committee from carrying out its mandate, leaving only a few meetings during the spring session. In this connection my delegation would like to express the wish that such procedural problems will not arise in the future, either to delay or to prevent this body from discharging the function the Conference has entrusted to it.

The work accomplished by the Ad hoc Committee on outer space has moved forward the examination and identification of various questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in space. The debates that took place in the Committee, although sometimes repetitive, did provide a wealth of information because they not only led to an understanding of a number of problems whose complexity has been unanimously acknowledged, but also provided us with a better perception of the positions that were set out. In fact it is in this same spirit that my delegation intends to make a few comments on the three points of the Committee's programme of work.

With regard to the first question, concerning the examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, my delegation feels that everything should be done to ensure that outer space remains the common heritage of mankind. If such an objective, which is highly prized by all members of the international community, is to be attained, it is imperative to opt for making the exploration and use of space an area for international co-operation, whose purpose must be exclusively peaceful and in the interest of all countries without any exception

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whatsoever. The advent of the atom and the conquest of space have been the two major scientific and technological achievements of this second half of our century. The atom has been the object of many civilian applications that have given rise to great hopes for the whole of mankind. It has, alas, also led to the development of an entire arsenal of nuclear weapons that are capable of destroying human civilization. As to the conquest of space, it has certainly opened up new fields of research and activity. In this way it has been at the origin of solutions found to the many problems that man has been facing on Earth. They include weather forecasts that have been made more precise and more rapid thanks to satellites. Exploration of the Earth by means of remote sensing has produced unexpected results in agriculture, hydrology, geology, environment, oceanography. I might also mention satellite telecommunications and radio navigation, etc.

Unfortunately, the use of space has not been confined solely to peaceful or civilian purposes. Out of the 2,500 satellites that have been launched since 1957, more than 75 per cent perform purely military functions: observation, surveillance, photography, missile launch detection, surveillance of theatres of conflict, early warning, and so forth. In addition to these activities, which in reality represent the extension of purely civilian space activities for military requirements, there are the recent developments that have occurred in the 1980s, namely, the development, testing and, very likely, the deployment of new systems of weapons which can be used in or from space. In the light of what I have said, we must recognize that the conquest of space is not separable from the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race. Moreover, the exploration and use of space have been carried out in the global context of East-West rivalry and the arms race between the major Powers. It is perhaps this observation that inspired the prophecy by Christopher Lee and Bhupendra Jasani, in their book Countdown to Space War, that: "if the two super-Powers go to war any time after, say, 1990, it is very likely that the war would start in space."

With regard to existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, my delegation considers that the body of law that is applicable to outer space is insufficient, and continues to believe that the Charter of the United Nations is the basis of the rules of international law that govern all space activities. It is natural that the provisions of the Charter governing relations among States on Earth should guide their activities in space. It is thus that the scope of the principle of the non-use of force should be broadened to encompass space in order to ensure protection of space objects. Nevertheless, realism prompts us to share the view of those that consider that since this same principle is not respected on Earth, it would be presumptuous to count on its application in space. This lacuna in the Charter nevertheless gave rise to international awareness of the need for space law. This law benefited from the fact that this need for rules was felt and later accepted and understood by the instigators of the conquest of space. It has been given shape progressively by a series of international instruments - notably the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial bodies, the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space

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Objects, the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space and the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, as well as a number of bilateral agreements, the most well-known of which is the ABM Treaty.

These multilateral agreements have codified a number of principles, such as the prohibition of the placing in orbit around the Earth of any object with nuclear weapons or any weapon of mass destruction; the use of the Moon and the other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes; the prohibition of the development of military bases, the testing of weapons of all types and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies; and the prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons or the conduct of nuclear explosions in space. It is true that these principles have impeded the arms race in space. Nevertheless, they were not such as to form a juridical barrier preventing any militarization or arms race in space. These rules are perceived as having value as a string of restrictions limiting certain military activities without its being possible to incorporate them into a global ban. There are therefore a number of gaps and loopholes which have allowed what the experts in this field call - and rightly so - the "creeping arms race". In this context I could cite, for instance, the 1967 outer space Treaty, the limited scope of which has been recognized by all. This Treaty bans the introduction into space of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction, but leaves open the possibility of placing in space other weapons such as anti-satellite weapons or anti-ballistic-missile systems. Another problem of great importance is that pertaining to "demilitarization" as contemplated in these treaties. The scope of this concept is limited solely to stellar space, which means the Moon and the other celestial bodies, depriving it of any effect on the remainder of Cosmic space. Moreover, clashing interpretations continue to prevent an identical interpretation of the words "peaceful purposes". To these juridical lacunae we should add the observation that the evolution of space science and technology, combined with space projects and programmes, especially military ones, is progressing more rapidly than space law. We must therefore conclude that current international legal instruments are insufficient to prevent an arms race in space. This is why our analysis tallies with that of many delegations in emphasizing the urgent need to fill out, strengthen and broaden the present legal régime in order to effectively prevent any arms race whatsoever in outer space.

The discussions that have taken place in the Ad hoc Committee on outer space since its establishment in 1985 have been fruitful with regard to the third part of its work. The Committee has received a certain number of proposals which prompt two comments. Firstly, these proposals displayed variety and came from all the groups, which represents a laudable collective effort and endeavour. Secondly, these proposals and these initiatives, through their diversity and the large number of sponsors, have shown that there was not only food for thought here, but also work to be done and an effort to be undertaken. In this connection, my delegation in no way intends to review all these proposals, which the Mongolian delegation has taken the welcome initiative of compiling in document CD/905. Nor does it intend to express a preference for one proposal or another, because it believes that the option or options that will be finally approved by the Committee have already been dictated to it by the objective being pursued, which is the prevention of

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an arms race in outer space. This is especially so as the ways and means of achieving it have already been defined both in the Final Document and in the relevant General Assembly resolution I have already referred to.

What my delegation would like to underscore, is that the Ad hoc Committee on outer space is at a decisive turning-point in its work. The past four years of work have enabled it to conduct a diagnostic study of space, and even to carry out a synoptic analysis of the activities, especially the military activities, that take place there. From this work the Committee must now proceed to the next phase, which will involve devising appropriate answers to the questions that have been raised and to rectify the anomalies that have been perceived in the "juridical fabric" of space. This is no easy task, because we are not unaware of the pitfalls facing the Committee in its task - especially as there are many deep divergences among delegations. Nevertheless, whatever the magnitude of this disagreement, it should not constitute a handicap which would paralyse the Committee, but should be an incentive for us to renew our efforts to attain our common goal.

Obviously, our view of what we hoped for from this Committee is optimistic. Above and beyond the political distance which separates those who want a simple strengthening of present space law and those who urge radical solutions through new international instruments, especially a ban on the use of force in space or a ban on placing weapons of all types in space, or yet again those who are in favour of the adoption of limited measures designed to increase confidence or guarantee the immunity of artificial satellites, we may observe two common denominators: a collective - although sometimes unequal - perception of the danger of the militarization of space, and a common will to work for the prevention of an arms race in space. The two components of this observation fortify us in our evaluation of the work accomplished so far by the Committee. Moreover, they give us reasons for trusting in the capacity of this body to deal squarely with the question of proposals and initiatives capable of offering a concrete response to the risks of an arms race in outer space.

In 1984, that is to say a year before the Conference on Disarmament established its Ad hoc Committee on outer space, the Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco devoted its spring session to the "Ethics of space conquest". One of its distinguished members, the American astronaut, Neil Armstrong, who was the first man to walk on the Moon, gave a presentation entitled "New knowledge of the Earth through the exploration of space". He concluded this presentation by noting that the exploration of space has in fact led to very precious knowledge about the Earth, and that the exploration of space has also been the exploration of the Earth. This statement, which underlines clearly the close link between space and the Earth, prompts me to express the wish that space will continue to bring about beneficial co-operation and peace for all the peoples of our planet. Moreover, may the present work of the Ad hoc Committee take the direction that will lead it to the adoption of measures or agreements so that space, this natural extension of our planet, is spared the arms race for ever.

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I would not wish to conclude my statement without warmly congratulating Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, who is chairing the Ad hoc Committee on outer space for the second time. The talents he displayed during his first term as Chairman were unanimously appreciated. We wish him every success in his new term and assure him of our full and total consideration.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. We have now heard three speakers. The fourth speaker today is His Excellency the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, who has been detained this morning by unavoidable official duties. Consquently we will hear his statement this afternoon, starting at 3.30 in plenary session. Meanwhile I call on the distinguished representative of Iran, who has asked for the floor.

Mr. ASADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): It is with profound sorrow and regret that I inform the Conference on Disarmament of the sad and untimely demise of Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 3 June 1989. The Islamic Republic of Iran and indeed the whole Islamic world have lost an irreplaceable leader, a great scholar of theology and philosophy, a man of knowledge and virtue whose long and ceaseless struggle for the cause of Islam and the oppressed needs no explanation. Imam Khomeini's noble crusade for the oppressed and for the reassertion of the Muslim's identity and dignity and justice for the oppressed won him the love and admiration of the oppressed masses across the world, Muslim masses included. His exemplary valour and determination in defence of Islamic principles and values and for the realization of the Islamic ideals have indeed awakened a new sense of identity among the world's Muslims and laid the corner-stone for a fully fledged Islamic renaissance. The popular sentiments of grieving masses in various countries after the departure of the Imam bear witness to the fact that he has left his indelible imprint forever on the conscience and memory of the present generation. Future generations will undoubtedly cherish the great values of the life and struggle of Imam Khomeini and his dedication to truth and justice.

On my own behalf and on behalf of my delegation, Ambassador Nasseri, the Government and people of Iran, I would like to thank all those who have expressed their sympathy and condolences, either personally, or through signing the condolence book which was open at our residence last week. I assure you all, distinguished fellow diplomats, that my Government and the family of Imam Khomeini will be duly informed of your sympathy.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should now like to refer to various matters connected with our work. As is customary, we are to adopt our programme of work for the second part of the present session, and the secretariat has also received requests from non-member States to participate in our work. If there is no objection, we will convene an informal meeting once we have reached the end of the list of speakers in order to examine these matters. We will then resume the plenary meeting to formalize such agreements as we may arrive at. If there is no objection, we shall proceed in that manner.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have asked the secretariat to circulate for the information of the Conference a copy of a communication received from the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, in which reference is made to paragraph 23 of the Committee's report. In that paragraph, "recalling the request in the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty with respect to article V, the Preparatory Committee decided to invite the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. In this connection, the Preparatory Committee decided to request the Conference on Disarmament to enable States parties not members of the Conference on Disarmament to participate in this consideration in accordance with its rules of procedure".

If there are no other speakers for the moment, I shall now suspend the plenary meeting and convene the informal meeting we agreed to hold today to consider the programme of work and requests from non-member States to participate in our work.

The meeting was suspended on 11.35 a.m. and resumed at 11.38 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 508th plenary meeting is resumed to adopt decisions on the matters dealt with informally. As regards the programme of work (CD/WP.364), I understand that there are no objections from any of the members of the Conference. Since that is the case, the programme of work is approved.

Concerning the requests from Syria and Jordan to participate in our work, contained in documents CD/WP.365 and Add.1, I understand that here too there are no observations or objections, and consequently we can approve them by consensus. The requests are approved.

As I announced earlier, we will now suspend the plenary meeting until 3.30 p.m., when the Conference will be addressed by His Excellency the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans. The secretariat informs me that, as agreed by the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, Contact Group A of that Committee will meet immediately after the plenary has been suspended, and until 1 p.m., in this same room.

The meeting was suspended at 11.40 a.m. and resumed at 3.40 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 508th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I have special pleasure in welcoming His Excellency the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, who has come to address the Conference. Senator Evans, who has a solid academic record in the field of constitutional law, has pursued a brilliant political career in his country's Parliament since 1978, rising to the delicate responsibility of management of government

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business in the Senate. The Senator also has extensive international experience as a result of his performance of high-level government functions, and has already followed our work on 7 February 1985, when he attended the 289th plenary meeting as Assistant Minister to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. His second visit to the Conference bears witness to Australia's interest and active participation in all disarmament matters. I now give the floor to His Excellency the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans.

Mr. EVANS (Australia): I am very pleased indeed to be able to address the Conference on Disarmament again, Mr. President, and particularly on this occasion to do so under your presidency. Your personal outstanding and tireless work in the field of arms control and disarmament is very well known to us in Australia, not least, of course, because of the award to you of the Nobel Peace Prize. I am deeply flattered to have the opportunity to speak in a Conference under your presidency.

We are passing through a period of the greatest significance for the future of the international community. We are, as so many have acknowledged, at a watershed, a turning-point in international relations. The end of the cold war has not been marked by a single day on which hostilities ceased or a peace treaty was signed. Rather it has been a matter of the major Powers rethinking their national interests and the means of advancing them, and embarking on a major overhaul of their whole approach to nuclear deterrence and the arms race.

In November 1985 in this city, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, as he then was, jointly declared that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. In the years since we have witnessed a quite extraordinary succession of developments. In October 1986 we saw one of the first tangible gains, the Stockholm Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe. Then came the historic INF Agreement, signed in December 1987 and ratified in June 1988. In March 1989 the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe opened in Vienna. Both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have now tabled proposals in these negotiations that can - and I believe will - transform Europe's political and military landscape.

These heartening developments have not been confined to Europe. We have also seen the Soviet Union withdraw its forces from Afghanistan; sustained and productive efforts to bring to an end debilitating regional conflicts in the Persian Gulf, southern Africa and Indo-China; and the remarkable spectacle during last year's joint verification experiment of Soviet and American personnel spending several weeks working at the Nevada and Semipalatinsk nuclear test sites.

The present Soviet leadership now acknowledges that the Soviet Union's military build-up was excessive and that some substantial unilateral actions by the Soviet Union, such as the force cuts announced by President Gorbachev in December last year, were appropriate. Unilateral steps are, of course, only the beginning. Deeper and more far-reaching measures, matching reality to the new rhetoric and atmospherics, can only come about in partnership with others. The Western Powers have been prudently cautious. We have not

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forgotten the high expectations and deep disappointment associated with détente in the 1970s. It is apparent, however, that the West now fully recognizes the enormous potential for mutually beneficial change inherent in the totality of reform taking place in the USSR, and is prepared to respond constructively. Above all it is the linkage, indeed the synergy, between internal reform and new thinking on foreign and defence policy in the USSR that is so profoundly encouraging. The Soviet Union is beginning to build into its internal processes the vital checks and balances of democratic principles.

The Australian Government has welcomed and encouraged the strong and balanced improvement in East/West relations in recent years. Unprecedented opportunities have emerged from this to limit, and limit decisively, the global arms race and to build in its place constructive and co-operative relationships responsive to international problems that for too long have been overshadowed by our preoccupation with military security. It is our profound hope that the attitudes and outlooks characteristic of recent decades will be progressively changed all around the world, allowing all countries gradually and naturally to de-escalate their defence preparations without compromising their security. At the same time, the role of formal agreements remains of irreducible importance. In our view, it is essential that we press ahead and steadily expand the body of international law relating to security. We must seize the present window of opportunity, and help ensure that it remains open.

This Conference has quite a central role to play in this endeavour. We have in the past shared the frustration of many members of the Conference on Disarmament that it could not work when East/West relations deteriorated and was not allowed to work when they improved. This led, in turn, to successive rounds of debate about which issues properly belonged in the multilateral arena. Australia very much hopes that this sterile debate can now be put behind us. Circumstances have moved far beyond the stage where our collective concern was somehow to find a way of breaking the log-jam. We now have the will to negotiate, and a clear immediate agenda that will tax the resources of all countries concerned. In our view the basis of a constructive partnership between bilateral and multilateral forums can be readily discerned, and the respective forums should now focus their energies fully on completing priority tasks.

My predecessor as Australian Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, addressed this Conference in August 1984. I think there is a stark contrast between the tone and content of my remarks today and the very sombre and impatient note of that earlier address. This in itself is testimony to how far we have come in a comparatively short time. It is equally striking, however, that the agenda that Mr. Hayden was commenting on, and indeed that I was commenting on in early 1985 when I spoke here, as you said - that agenda is exactly the same as that before the Conference today. This underscores my observation that the CD must now focus on the issues on which it has the competence and the authority to conclude solid, verifiable agreements.

Let me comment first on the subject of chemical weapons. This Conference has a unique role and responsibility as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. In exercising that role and discharging that

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responsibility, the Conference is engaged in an undertaking of immense significance in the negotiation of a comprehensive and universal convention on chemical weapons. The improvement in international relations which is a feature of our times does present us with an opportunity to conclude the CW convention. This is an opportunity which cannot and must not be lost. All of us are united in our abhorrence of these weapons and our commitment to ensure that they are banned for all time. Through a universal convention, the Conference will make an historic contribution to international security and stability. The Paris Conference, held in January, provided the impetus for the negotiating process this year. The collective call by 149 States to intensify the chemical weapons convention negotiations, and to conclude the convention at the earliest date, could not have been clearer. We appreciate very greatly, may I say, the energetic and creative approach of the Chairman of the CW Committee, Ambassador Morel of France, whom I had the pleasure of meeting earlier this afternoon, in injecting the international community's expression of commitment at the Paris Conference into the work of this Committee. Under his leadership, the Committee has the prospect of recording real progress this year.

Others who have addressed this plenary in recent times have asserted that the final text of the CW convention is within reach. I share that conviction. I am convinced that, with a concerted and sustained effort by all members of this Conference, the text of the convention can be finalized in the very near future. As a result of developments in recent years, most of the major conceptual issues, and many of the details, have been resolved. This has been achieved through the active participation of the entire membership of the Conference, which is essential if the convention is to have universal validity. A perusal of the "rolling text" reveals that a considerable amount of technical detail apparently still awaits resolution. However, this is not a reason for prolonging the negotiation process, which has now been going on for many years. Rather, it is up to us to address the outstanding issues rigorously - to look constructively for solutions that will bring about the early conclusion of an effective convention. The problem posed by chemical weapons is serious; a convention is needed without delay; this Conference has a responsibility to provide it.

The achievement of a global chemical weapons convention is one of the Australian Government's principal disarmament objectives. Our commitment to that objective is reflected in our active participation, over many years, in the negotiations in Geneva and our technical contribution to that process through, for example, the conduct of national trial inspections. An area of the convention with which Australia has been particularly associated in recent times, as you have been aware, has been those provisions which concern the interrelationship between States parties and their national chemical industries. This is of course a crucial aspect of the convention. It is imperative that the right balances be struck in the text - between the need to ensure that chemical weapons are not being produced by the chemical industry of a State party; the right of States parties to be able to engage in activities not prohibited by the convention; and for chemical industries to be able to operate without overburdensome monitoring or intrusion.

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The provisions which have been developed so far represent, in our view, a sensible approach, envisaging as they do specific levels and schemes of monitoring for different categories of schedules of chemicals, depending on the risk they are considered to pose to the aims of the convention. A lot of work has already been done in this area. The "rolling text" indicates, however, that a number of questions remain to be resolved. In the last couple of years, successive chairmen have initiated discussions with representatives of industry, to help them understand what the negotiations are seeking to achieve and to allow them to express their views and concerns to the negotiators. These consultations have been valuable initiatives, and Australia welcomes a similar exchange which is to take place under Ambassador Morel later this month.

But there will need to be further work done to achieve a universal understanding within the chemical industry of the implications of a chemical weapons convention, and the ways in which the industry can contribute to the elaboration of provisions which will be both practical and effective. In Australia's case, we have developed a very productive dialogue with our chemical industry on chemical weapons issues, encompassing the CW convention negotiations, over a number of years. Our industry has stated publicly its commitment to a CW convention and its total opposition to chemical weapons. Such a dialogue between governments and their chemical industries can be of enormous benefit for the convention from two perspectives: in resolving outstanding questions and thereby facilitating the early conclusion of the convention, and in ensuring that the convention is implemented effectively, both for government and industry. Through this dialogue, industry will be able to develop its understanding of its role and responsibilities in international endeavours to eradicate chemical weapons, in particular the contribution it can make to a global, comprehensive ban on those weapons.

There is a need as we see it for this dialogue to be intensified, developed and extended to all relevant countries. It is for this reason that on 7 March I announced that Australia would host a Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons. The Conference will be held this year, from 18 to 22 September, in our national capital Canberra. The Conference will bring together governments and representatives of chemical industries world-wide, with the aim of raising their awareness about the problems of chemical weapons, and considering ways in which they can work together, in partnership, both internationally and domestically, in support of a comprehensive convention.

Australia has invited to the Conference all member countries of the CD, as you are aware, other countries with significant chemical industries and those countries with a particular interest in chemical weapons issues. Such participation will encourage the universal support which the convention must secure and which Australia is intent upon generating. It will be a joint effort designed to give, and which we believe will give, impetus to the negotiations here in Geneva. To facilitate the full and effective implementation of a convention, industry must appreciate its role in addressing the problem. Verification procedures under the convention will require the co-operation of industry to achieve full effect. The time to take this step is now, so that effective consultation begins while the convention is being negotiatied. Let there be no misunderstanding as to what Australia

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is about in hosting this Conference. It is fundamental to our approch that the Government-Industry Conference that we are proposing to host take place in the context of the important negotiations being conducted here, in the Conference on Disarmament, on a chemical weapons convention; that it support fully those negotiations; and that in its own way it contributes to and moves forward those negotiations. There is no separate agenda. This Conference is what we are about in pursuing chemical weapons objectives, and the universal chemical weapons convention is the only objective that we are seeking to obtain. We believe the Government-Industry Conference will provide that support and contribute to the early conclusion of that convention - which we must achieve without further delay.

In addition to bringing about an increased dialogue between government and industry, it is also important to ensure that those countries which are not members or observers of the CD be fully informed about the convention which is being negotiated, so that they can give it their support and become parties to it at an early stage. Australia has been active in international efforts towards this objective. In June 1988 our Prime Minister announced that Australia would launch an initiative to raise regional awareness about chemical weapons issues. In that respect Australian officials have visited South-East Asia, Indo-China and the South Pacific to promote understanding of and support for the chemical weapons convention. This dialogue will be followed by a regional seminar which is also to be held in Canberra on 3 and 4 August, which we believe will reinforce the growing regional consensus in support of a convention. This may be an example which could usefully be followed by other CD members in their own regions.

A nuclear test ban has been a sought-after arms control measure for over 30 years. It is the first item on the agenda of this Conference. In the late 1950s and again in the late 1970s - on both occasions in forums outside the CD and its predecessors - we appear to have come tantalizingly close to concluding a test ban. In the 1980s, when the CD has been the focus of activity for this objective, progress, as we all know, has been frustratingly elusive. Australia has felt this frustration keenly. For well-understood and universally acknowledged reasons, nuclear disarmament is the priority objective. This involves progressively eliminating the existing arsenals and a commitment by all States, preferably through the non-proliferation Treaty, to be non-proliferators of nuclear weapons. Australia is deeply convinced that an effectively verifiable test ban has an essential contribution to make toward this objective and should, therefore, be concluded as soon as possible.

For more than five years, regrettably, the necessary consensus on the formation of an ad hoc committee has foundered on the question of a "negotiating" mandate. Australia would strongly prefer direct negotiations toward a comprehensive test-ban treaty and understands those who have been reluctant to accept anything less. Our greater concern, however, has been to see the CD begin concrete work on the outstanding issues such as scope, verification and compliance. There is no doubt in our mind that essential work directed unambiguously at a CTBT can be done under a non-negotiating mandate. Accordingly, we have consistently urged that the CD not be prevented from doing the work essential to a comprehensive test-ban treaty simply because this work is not described as the negotiation of a treaty. It is, I have to say, an indictment of the CD's prolonged inertia on this central issue

(Mr. Evans, Australia)

that there is a proposal for a separate conference to transform the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The CD itself has the authority, the permanence and the expertise to move forward on a CTBT, an objective that the overhwelming majority of the international community have repeatedly signalled they wish to see concluded urgently. We are encouraged by the movement toward a consensus that has emerged this year through the patient efforts of Ambassador Yamada of Japan. It is imperative that all members of the Conference display the necessary flexibility to allow the CD to meet its responsibilities and commence work toward a CTBT.

Effective verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty will be strongly dependent on a reliable international seismic monitoring network. Australia has proposed that such a network be established promptly on the basis of existing assets, and subsequently developed to build confidence in its practical capabilities. Apart from being key participants in such a network, the nuclear-weapon States could make an important practical contribution by making available comprehensive data on their nuclear tests in accordance with the General Assembly resolution sponsored by Australia on the notification of nuclear tests.

The bilateral super-Power negotiations on nuclear testing are an important reality. Although the mandate for these negotiations is far more cautious on the timing of a CTBT than Australia would prefer, it remains a fact that these negotiations have the potential to make a significant contribution. In the Australian Government's view, it is entirely reasonable in contemporary circumstances to expect the super-Powers to lead the way, by negotiating promptly and expeditiously toward militarily significant interim limitations on nuclear testing.

The final issue that I would like to touch on more briefly today is outer space. From one perspective, we have collectively displayed an imperfect but still admirable degree of restraint in the military exploitation of space. The space age is over 30 years old and space programmes have been driven overwhelmingly by military requirements, and yet we have in practical terms very largely avoided extending into space the offence/defence competition so familiar from the other environments. As a consequence of this restraint, there is wide acceptance of the view that space assets have made, and continue to make, a strong positive contribution to peace and stability. It is sobering to speculate on the course of events over the past 30 years had we not possessed the communication, intelligence-gathering and surveillance/verification capabilities afforded by space assets. The Australian Government considers the protection of this state of affairs to be of central importance.

The objective of this Conference on this issue - and the objective proclaimed by the super-Powers in February 1985 - is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The word "prevention" in this context is especially significant. In all other environments we have had to set a much tougher goal, namely, stopping and reversing an arms race through seeking stability at progressively lower force levels. The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space is of course aware of just how complex a field this is. I do not propose to comment in any detail on the issues that it has exposed: for example, the lack of clarity on key terms like "peaceful uses", the precise scope of the existing legal régime for outer space, or the

(Mr. Evans, Australia)

different views on whether a meaningful distinction can be drawn between dedicated anti-satellite systems and systems with an incidental or potential anti-satellite capability. I would, however, like to make the observation that, in our view, preventing an arms race in outer space is crucially dependent on addressing the incentives to acquire space weaponry. We cannot expect to secure binding restraints on systems capable of destroying or disabling space assets unless we develop a clear and common understanding on acceptable functions for these assets.

The degree of interest in ballistic missile defences correlates strongly and inversely with the prospects of addressing the ballistic missile threat in other ways. Similarly, interest in anti-satellite systems will persist unless the functions performed by satellites stay within agreed parameters. Members of this Conference will recognize the linkage between this observation and Australia's long-standing proposal that the Ad hoc Committee consider measures to protect from attack all satellites and associated ground stations that contribute to strategic stability and the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.

The Conference on Disarmament is conducting its work in uniquely propitious circumstances. To paraphrase the NATO declaration of 30 May this year, we can now exploit fully the potential of arms control to reduce the excessive weight of the military factor in international relations and increasingly to replace confrontation with co-operation. The Conference on Disarmament has the capacity to contribute substantively to this endeavour. The arms control agenda is extremely full. This Conference has a unique mandate for achieving real progress on that agenda. Our responsibility is therefore of vital importance, and we must fulfil that responsibility.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Thank you very much for your excellent statement, Mr. Minister. I am sure that many of our colleagues will find in it a source of reflection concerning objectives that we share.

I should like to inform the Conference that the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth of the United Kingdom, the Honourable William Waldegrave, M.P., is the first speaker for the next plenary meeting on Thursday. I would be grateful if delegations are ready to begin the plenary at 10 a.m. so that we can hear the Minister's statement punctually.

Before closing the meeting I should like to remind you that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will meet immediately afterwards in Room V. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 15 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.509
15 June 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 15 June 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)

GE.89-61380/3143A

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 509th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I have pleasure in welcoming the Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Honourable William Waldegrave, who has been a member of Parliament since 1979. Since then the Minister has occupied important political posts in the Parliament and also in the British Government, serving in various capacities as Minister of State since September 1985. He was appointed to his present post in July 1988; his responsibilities include East-West relations and other policy areas, notably disarmament and arms control and the process relating to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Minister is well known to the members of the Conference as the head of the British delegation to the Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States. I thank him for his interest in our work, and note the active participation of the United Kingdom in this Conference since its establishment in 1979. I now give the floor to the Honourable William Waldegrave.

Mr. WALDEGRAVE (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): It is a great honour, Mr. President, to be speaking to this Conference under your presidency. I believe that I am right in saying that you are the only person to have held the presidency of this Conference twice, and, as someone who holds what, with respect to my Swedish colleague, is recognized universally as the highest honour that can be won for work in peace, there can be no more suitable person to have had the honour of twice presiding over this Conference, and it is of particular pleasure to me that I address the Conference, therefore, with you in the Chair.

Three closely related themes are at the heart of what I have to say today about the stage this Conference - and the arms control process as a whole - has reached. First, in the years since this Conference was established, there has been an enormous improvement in East/West relations. We greatly welcome the new pragmatism in Soviet policy, and the developments in some Eastern European countries. We like to think that Britain - in particular our Prime Minister through the strong relationship she has forged with President Gorbachev - has been a major contributor to this process. We welcome the political and economic reforms that are in hand, and wish them success.

Nowhere has this progress been more evident than in the more productive approach now shown by both East and West to arms control. We are encouraged that in a number of fields long-standing Western proposals have at last been accepted as being offered in good faith, and as representing sensible, realistic and legitimate bases for co-operation. The new mood is exemplified by the Stockholm Document which opened up military activities in Europe to scrutiny by other CSCE countries. Then came the INF Treaty, the first treaty to make actual reductions in nuclear weapons, with path-breaking verification provisions of the type which will be essential to future treaties.

The prospects for more far-reaching agreements are good. The START talks resume in Geneva next week. In Vienna, the ambitious agenda of the CFE talks has been reinforced by the latest imaginative United States proposals, which

(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

were endorsed by NATO at its recent summit. The new proposals will widen the scope of the negotiations, firm up areas of tentative agreement, and accelerate its time scale. The Soviet response has been reasonably positive. There are good grounds to hope for a successful outcome to the negotiation which could transform - within a relatively short space of time - the European security situation. We welcome the accelerated timetable. The United Kingdom will work actively to meet it. It is no hardship, in our view, to exchange an arms race for a peace race.

My second theme emerges from the first: there is a close linkage between improvements in East/West relations and progress in arms control. The uneven progress of the last 20 years has shown how arms control negotiations are particularly sensitive to ups and downs in political relations. Arms control may help to reduce tension; but is itself much harder to achieve outside the context of improved political relations. Indeed, reducing arms does not of itself enhance security if mistrust of the other side's intentions persists, or if cheating is suspected. There are examples of this phenomenon from the inter-war period.

Verification is crucial in this respect - as much to increase confidence as to monitor compliance. The more we have, and the more effective, the better; but only, of course, if the verification demonstrates that there is no attempt to cheat. But the confidence on which successful arms control has to be based goes much wider. Trust is a quality which evolves from a general impression of the other side's behaviour over a whole range of fields. Political, economic, humanitarian and security issues are all inter-connected. There is no doubt, for example, that the process of Soviet economic and political reform has favourably impressed Western Governments. If the Soviet Government shows itself willing, as it is apparently doing, to allow the truth to be told inside the USSR, it is bound to build confidence that the truth will be told outside as well. There is no doubt, equally, of the damage that can be done by old-style Soviet behaviour in certain rather obvious areas. The foundations for international trust - including agreements on arms control - are laid at home. Real security involves putting aside not only threatening armaments, but also threatening ideologies. Ideological and military disarmament go hand in hand.

My third theme, therefore, is that we must not waste this moment of promise in East/West relations. Although events in China remind us that there is nothing inevitable about progress, the NATO summit declaration does not exaggerate when it says that it is now possible to seek to "move beyond the post-war period" and try to hammer out a "just and lasting peaceful order in Europe". To do this requires an imaginative approach to all aspects of relations, including arms control. The NATO declaration, we believe, offers an ambitious and enlightened vision for a new pattern of relations between the countries of East and West. This pattern would replace ideological and military antagonism with the building of co-operation between peoples, on the basis of what those peoples freely choose. Elements of such a pattern are already to be found in Western European institutions such as the Council of Europe, the European Community and EFTA. The continuing processes of economic and political reform in the East, and the lowering of barriers between East and West, should permit closer association between Eastern countries and these institutions. This will strengthen the interdependence of European countries,

(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

and our sense of common identity. The process of closer European integration may not be easy, or steady. Greater political freedom in Eastern Europe is the key. There are still many divisions to overcome. But Europeans can at last seriously believe a start is being made.

But we must broaden the focus from strictly East/West concerns. What is the significance of these three themes for the wider perspective of this Conference? Global security is indivisible. The massive armies facing each other in Europe must be of concern to the whole world. Wars that began in Europe have twice become world wars. It follows that the concept of European security for which we are now striving should have its influence in the wider world. Peace should be as infectious as conflict. Moreover, as successful arms control in Europe erodes armed confrontation there, military developments outside Europe will inevitably be thrown into sharper relief.

And it is not one-way traffic. The spread or use of weapons of mass destruction outside Europe's borders could lead to crises with world-wide implications. They could produce devastation in the regions directly concerned, and affect the security of other regions. The NATO declaration acknowledges this. It commits the allies to work to contain the security threats and destabilizing consequences of an uncontrolled spread of modern military technologies. The declaration makes plain that one of NATO's long-term priorities is to work for a world where military forces exist solely to preserve national independence and territorial integrity.

The issue of chemical weapons is immediately relevant here. A convention to ban chemical weapons is the active item on the agenda of this Conference. This is right, for in Europe the imbalance in chemical weapons between East and West is a potentially destabilizing factor of great significance. Outside Europe the number of countries with chemical weapons capabilities is growing. The problem is not just one of proliferation, serious though that is. Chemical weapons are also being used. We have all seen the horrifying consequences of their use relayed on our television screens. It is an awful reminder of our common vulnerability, and the pressing need for a global solution.

The Paris Conference, which I attended in January this year, made clear the widespread revulsion of the international community against the use of chemical weapons. It recognized that a comprehensive and global ban on such weapons offered the only effective solution. The clear message from Paris to Geneva was to urge you - to urge us - to redouble efforts here to achieve a ban. You have put a great deal of work into this. The general concept of the convention is in place. Progress has been made on the detail, although there is still much hard, technical work left. The need now is for a clear, practical, problem-solving approach to removing the remaining obstacles.

Verification remains the top priority. For a convention to work it needs verification which works. The existing verification provisions go a long way towards achieving this. But areas of particular concern remain. We must be satisfied that all high-risk facilities and activities are adequately covered, whether they are dual-purpose production plants or military installations. Further efforts are needed. The British approach is on two levels: practical verification proposals and efforts to shape the climate of international opinion.

(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

On the practical level, we have recently presented ideas for ad hoc inspections to strengthen the verification framework. Our aim was to carry forward the debate originating with the proposals of Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany in this area. More work is needed in this key area in order to establish a convincing structure for the verification régime. We have also recently presented a working paper on novel agents which aims to point up issues which have to be addressed in the negotiations. It is essential that the convention should be able to deal effectively with developments in chemical and biochemical technology.

On challenge inspection, we have been concentrating on a comprehensive programme of national trial inspections at a wide range of military facilities. Challenge inspection will of course be crucial to the verification of a convention. Yet there is still uncertainty about how to reconcile the rigour necessary for effective verification with the protection of legitimate national or commercial secrets. Our national trial inspections are starting to produce some answers. The paper, CD/921, which I have the honour to present today offers some interim observations in the light of our experience to date in trials at ammunition storage facilities. We will be giving a presentation on this subject with supporting video material during this session. And we hope to offer more considered conclusions after further practice inspections at more sensitive facilities.

We hope the United Kingdom's experience will be useful to others. For our part, we have found these trials invaluable. We strongly encourage others to carry out similar trials, if they have not already done so. The benefits of practical experimentation have also come out clearly in the considerable number of routine civil trial inspections held by various nations. Two points have emerged particularly strongly - concerns over commercial secrecy, and the need for work on verification technology. It is right that you should be looking closely at these issues. The time is now ripe to assess the lessons learnt from the trials for the "rolling text".

I return here to the second of the themes I introduced earlier. Underlying all this work is the basic question of confidence. Confidence between East and West is growing in many areas. Chemical weapons must not be exempt. This is why the lack of Soviet openness about their stockpile matters. It damages that indivisible quality of trust. We hope that the general improvement in the Soviet attitude to publishing data will soon extend to the area of chemical weapons, where evasion and distrust are currently a major obstacle to progress. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are well placed to offer a lead.

But all countries - not just NATO and the Warsaw Pact - have a collective responsibility to demonstrate in practical ways their commitment to the control of chemical weapons. We must all take practical steps to control the proliferation of chemical weapons and join international efforts to apply pressure to countries seeking to conceal their production or use. We must all give data on our national chemical weapons capability where this exists. We must all honour existing international obligations against the use of chemical weapons. Above all, we must recognize that the leap-frogging acquisition of chemical weapons undermines rather than enhances security, and we must work

(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

seriously - here in the Conference on Disarmament - for a global ban. The United Kingdom feels an increasing urgency about this. Our response must not be simply to bypass the work which remains to be done, but to put our backs into doing that work. Hence the detailed papers we keep tabling.

It is sometimes argued that the acquisition of chemical weapons is a justifiable response to the possession or acquisition of nuclear or conventional weapons by other States - whether suspected or actual. This is a false argument. There is no evidence that chemical weapons have ever had this deterrent effect in the past. But what we can predict is that, wherever they are introduced, chemical weapons are likely to have a destabilizing effect on the local balance of power as the other side looks for ways to catch up. In the medium term, everyone will gain from the verified, total ban which is the prime aim of this Conference. As for the threat from nuclear weapons, the best way to reduce that is not to oppose them with other weapons, but through a common effort to reduce existing numbers, and prevent nuclear proliferation.

The corner-stone of these efforts is the non-proliferation Treaty, the most important achievement of this Conference's forerunner, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The fourth NPT review conference takes place next year. It is important to give the Treaty our continuing support. The non-proliferation Treaty has left a durable - and vital - legacy. It has established an international climate hostile to proliferation. It is the most successful arms control treaty ever. Its signatories now total 138, with the recent welcome additions of Bahrain and Qatar.

We must not forget that in the early 1960s there was no established differentiation between nuclear research and development for peaceful and on the other hand military purposes. Many countries had the scientific and economic means to become nuclear-weapon States. The late President Kennedy speculated that by now there might be 20-30 nuclear-weapon States. That these fears have proved unfounded is thanks in large part to the non-proliferation Treaty. Since the Treaty came into force the number of nuclear-weapon States has been restricted to five.

The non-proliferation régime is more vital now than ever. As technology becomes more accessible, the non-proliferation Treaty needs to be kept in place for the security of all of us. This is particularly so for the non-nuclear-weapon States, which have considerably more to lose than nuclear-weapon States from additional countries acquiring a nuclear capability.

Certainly it is true that nuclear weapons are part of the European equation. But it has taken a long time to establish stable deterrence between East and West, and the process was not without its moments of tension. Regions where nuclear weapons do not already exist can only lose, in terms of security, from their introduction. It is all the more important to preserve the non-proliferation régime at a time when the prospects for cutting existing nuclear weapons are better than for many years. Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty enshrines the commitment to pursue negotiations on effective nuclear disarmament measures - an obligation which the nuclear-weapon States take seriously. It was no accident that the

(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

super-Powers announced their intention to begin bilateral talks on strategic nuclear weapons on the very day on which the Treaty opened for signature. Progress has up to now been slow. But I return again to my opening themes: negotiations were hindered for many years by the overall climate of East-West confrontation. But the climate now is very different. INF and START agreements will cut nuclear arsenals. NATO stockpiles of nuclear warheads in Europe have been reduced by 35 per cent in 10 years.

There is a growing corpus of agreements designed to build confidence and reduce the risk of incidents between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As East/West co-operation grows, there is an increasing readiness to work together to help resolve regional conflicts and global problems. All these developments enhance international security, which nuclear proliferation can only undermine. We welcome United States and Soviet moves to ratify the threshold test-ban Treaty and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. It is right that thought should then be given to further steps to control nuclear testing, as verification technology improves, and in parallel with progress in other areas of arms control. But an immediate move to a comprehensive test ban would be premature, and perhaps even destabilizing.

In East/West relations security will depend for the foreseeable future on deterrence based, in part, on nuclear weapons. That will mean a continuing requirement to conduct underground nuclear tests to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain effective and up to date. Throughout this gradual process of building up trust, and building down arsenals, the non-proliferation Treaty will remain an essential framework. There is no question, in the United Kingdom's view, of allowing the Treaty to lapse, or replacing it by a different type of agreement when it falls due for extension in 1995. The non-proliferation Treaty works, and it works well. I think there is an American saying: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it". Far better to work to reinforce it by encouraging all those countries which have not yet signed it to do so, and by further progress in East/West nuclear arms control.

The remarkable paintings on the walls and ceilings of this chamber symbolize contact and friendship between different regions of the globe. There are hopeful signs that the habit of co-operation is growing between East and West. But we must also look further afield. Security in Europe cannot exist in a vacuum. It can help promote security elsewhere in the world; but it can be damaged by insecurity elsewhere. We must work now to achieve the former and avoid the latter. Regional proliferation - nuclear and chemical - threatens to negate the East/West gains we have worked so hard to achieve. International stability is our common responsibility. It would be folly, and gross irresponsibility, with so much to play for, if we allowed the destabilizing influence of chemical weapons and nuclear proliferation to get out of hand. It is the job of the Conference on Disarmament to prevent that happening. The time is right. We must provide decisive leadership to all the nations in establishing the common mechanisms and exercising the restraint which will permit security and peace for us all. I wish you success in your work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Honourable William Waldegrave for his visit to this Conference, for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

Now I should like to turn to another matter. Today the secretariat has circulated a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable was prepared after consultations with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As is customary, the timetable is indicative and is subject to change if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 20 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.510
20 June 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 20 June 1989, at 10 a.m..

President: Mr. Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)

GE.89-61413/3124A

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 510th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference continues today its consideration of items 1 and 2 on its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Yugoslavia, Canada, the German Democratic Republic and Argentina. I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, it is a particular pleasure for me to see you in the chair of our Conference - the representative of a friendly country with which Yugoslavia maintains relations of close co-operation. The more so because it is well known that you have devoted all your proven abilities to the cause of disarmament. The prominent award you have been granted represents well-deserved recognition of your personal endeavours and contribution.

I wish also to congratulate your predecessors, Ambassador Bullut of Kenya and Ambassador Yamada of Japan, for their successful guidance of the Conference.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin my best wishes for success in his new assignment. I would like to congratulate Minister Batsanov on his appointment as head of the Soviet delegation to the Conference, and assure him of the co-operation of my delegation. Let me also say to our dear colleagues who are going to leave us soon - distinguished Ambassadors Mario Cámpora, Aldo Pugliese and Nihal Rodrigo - how privileged I felt to enjoy their friendship and co-operation and how grateful my delegation is for their valuable contribution to the Conference. I wish them all the best in their important new assignments.

We are witnessing a series of important changes in international relations in general, as well as an unprecedented broadening in both the quantity and the quality of disarmament negotiations. There has been a steady increase in significant comprehensive and specific initiatives, and a considerable convergence of views between negotiating parties has emerged. I would like to underline the particular importance of the rapprochement of disarmament proposals on conventional disarmament in Europe, the most heavily armed continent, including the announced negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles. These positive developments at the bilateral and regional European level are in sharp contrast and even contradiction with the slowing down, if not stagnation of the multilateral disarmament negotiations that we are going through. They would appear to have been placed under a kind of moratorium. The situation with regard to many items on the agenda of our Conference confirms this judgement.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

This contrast requires a serious analysis of all the factors that determine it. Multilateral disarmament does not mean - or, at least does not exclusively mean - one specific negotiating table. Rather, it should be regarded as an expression of the need to promote a sort of global thinking, the establishment of a new concept of security as a common endeavour, and maximization of the capacity of the international community to cope with new problems. In short - the multilateral approach is needed to advance the idea of universal adherence to the existing treaties and to keep the extremely complex vehicle of the international system going. The multilateral démarche is not an abstract democracy but rather an expression of the new emerging reality that disarmament problems have to be addressed and solved at the universal level.

One might offer several possible explanations of the gap between the activation of bilateral and inter-alliance negotiations on the one hand and the slowing down of multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament on the other. I would like to suggest that if these conditions were to persist they could, in the final analysis, erode the consistency and even the credibility of disarmament negotiations in other fields. Having said that, I do not wish to imply that there is inherently any contradiction among the multilateral, bilateral and regional negotiations, but rather that they should form a part of the same process. At the same time it becomes more difficult to explain the different dynamics and to interpret the contradiction between them.

The outcome of the first part of this year's session left much to wish for. There is no doubt that no one could easily be satisfied with it. It would indeed be very difficult to explain to world public opinion why the Conference did not achieve more. If in the past it was possible to attribute the reluctance to negotiate to the existence of an unfavourable international environment, the same argument does not hold now that serious reconsideration of former concepts in East-West relations and of security issues is taking place and is having a positive impact on the international climate as a whole. We must therefore critically review our work and strive during the next two and a half months to take serious steps forward, at least on the three most important items - a nuclear test ban, the comprehensive ban on chemical weapons and the prevention of an an arms race in outer space.

After years of stalemate, we believe that there is now a real opportunity for progress on an NTB, an item recognized by an overwhelming number of States as having the highest priority, above any other on the disarmament agenda. Indeed, for decades now a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests has been the subject of persistent demands by the great majority of the international community, as is evident from a number of resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the documents of ministerial and summit meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, and other meetings at governmental or non-governmental levels. An NTB is also an international legal obligation under certain multilateral treaties, namely the non-proliferation Treaty and the partial test-ban Treaty. The initiative sponsored by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia to amend the PTBT and achieve a comprehensive test ban has so far gained the support of more than 40 States parties. The initiative does not preclude the CD from performing its legitimate role in dealing with that issue. An NTB represents a test of the durability and credibility of the whole non-proliferation régime.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

This Conference has, however, been prevented from negotiating on the item. The reasons and justifications offered are, in our view, not valid. Nuclear disarmament has, after all, begun with the implementation of the INF Treaty, and it would be normal to expect a more active role on the part of the CD in the search for ways and means to start concrete substantial work, that should at the same time be placed in the context of the fourth NPT review conference.

More than a year ago, the Group of 21 presented a draft mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban, based on the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and on the draft mandate presented at the previous session of the CD by the spnsors of the General Assembly resolution. This draft mandate is supported by the great majority of CD members since it represents a rational and yet a broad basis for a start of serious consideration of the item. Consequently we believe it would be appropriate once again to try to find a way to secure the acceptance of this draft mandate. But for my delegation even the draft mandate presented by the delegation of Czechoslovakia (CD/863) is acceptable. We are convinced that the importance of affirming the role of the CD on nuclear issues should prevail over formal considerations. It is no time to hesitate, but rather to take positive and effective action. We fully appreciate the dedicated and creative consultations carried out by Ambassador Yamada aimed at finding a common basis for agreement.

The next priority item - the universal and comprehensive prohibition of chemeical weapons - represents a historic challenge for the Conference and for the multilateral approach to disarmament. It is not only the negotiating capacity of the Conference that is at stake here, but also the credibility of the repeated declarations of political commitment. The declaration adopted by the Paris Conference was a welcome expression of an universal political consensus on the need to conclude the convention on chemical weapons as soon as possible. Any hesitation now would have a serious impact not only on the work of the Conference but on the dynamics of disarmament as a whole.

The Conference has already done considerable work on a number of complex conceptual and technical issues. While mindful of the differences on various substantive aspects, I nevertheless believe that the convention is within our reach and that the degree of agreement in principle is greater than it may seem at first sight. Ambassador Morel continues to inject new energy into the work of the chemical weapons Committee. However, it is our impression that the Ad hoc Committee has not yet tackled thoroughly the substance of certain key problems.

I wish to address only some of them. First of all, we should abandon any ambition that the convention should cover every single detail, any possible event or situation. We would never reach our goal in that way. The demands for strict control of the production of chemicals, even in the smallest facilities, and the overplaying of the importance of protecting commercial secrets, fall into this category. By adopting a more rational and realistic approach to these two questions we could more easily come to satisfactory solutions.

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The system of international control and verification should be rational - i.e. cost-effective and efficient. We consider it fully justified to raise the question of how to control and verify facilities that would not be subject to routine or challenge inspection, bearing in mind that both of these kinds of inspection obviously have their own limitations. A number of suggestions and opinions on that question have been put forward. They offer quite a solid base for establishing a common framework acceptable to all.

The starting-point on this question must be an understanding that, once established, an international mechanism to oversee the implementation of the convention should have specific responsibility, including the capacity to take action on its own initiative and preserve its independence vis-à-vis any State party to the convention. On the other hand, the strict obligation of States parties to respect the ban on chemical weapons production fully should be verifiable through declarations in a national register, e.g. of any facility that could represent a potential risk for the convention. To this end, the international inspectorate should include these facilities too in the draft annual programme of control. A schedule for inspections might also be based on the quota system, leaving the final choice of facilities and dates to be decided upon by the international inspectorate. The international inspectorate could take into account, for example, not only general risks for the convention, but also specific requests, suggestions and suspicions from various sources.

In spite of the different approaches still existing in the Conference with regard to the question of "challenge" inspection, we consider the largest part of this question as agreed upon, especially the part formulated in the "Ekéus paper". However, an important question in this domain remains open. The final judgement should be the responsibility of the international organs, and not only the concern of the States parties involved. Otherwise, we might ask ourselves what would be the real role of the Executive Council or of the Conference of States Parties. Of course, any politicization of the final judgement on the outcome of the inspection and its content should be avoided.

Although the question of the composition of the Executive Council has not been fully addressed so far, we consider that its solution should reflect our common concern for the universality of the convention. The first condition should be the full equality of all States parties. Membership in any organ or body of the future international mechanism should not be treated as a privilege. We are, however, aware that the composition of an international organ cannot avoid some reflection of realities and divisions in our world, and has to provide the necessary balance aimed at the elimination of political partiality and tension. This might be achieved through adequate political and regional representation. Any additional criteria or a different approach should be supported by relevant and valid reasons.

In our current negotiations on article XI, relating to economic and technological development and co-operation, some differences still exist. It seems, however, that these differences are in a way artificial. The convention in itself will represent simultaneously a result and an instrument of international co-operation. It will be, in itself, an incentive for co-operation in economic and technological development. In short, the

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convention will lead to fewer suspicions, less distrust and less fear. We will be turned towards each other, rather than confronting each other. In this article the convention must reflect exactly such an approach, and we believe there is, in fact, already a broad consensus on that point.

Regarding adherence to and duration of the convention, the text must explicitly provide that they will not be limited. The question of withdrawal from membership is related to this. The final solution of this question must be viewed within the framework of the justified demands for universality, or, at least, the need for the inclusion of all countries with a technological capability to produce chemical weapons. Such an approach already contains specific limitations on withdrawal from the convention.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another item on which the Conference is lagging behind the disquieting spread of militarization of outer space.

Outer space is our common place. The spread of the arms race to outer space, if continued, will have unpredictable consequences and court dangers which will be more difficult to control later. It should therefore be prevented and halted at the earliest opportunity. Otherwise, in a very short time we would face its destabilizing effects on international relations as a whole. The Conference cannot be excluded from negotiating efforts towards that end.

Furthermore, outer space is being used more and more for peaceful purposes, with the increasing participation of countries in search of a model of international co-operation. In that context, it is imperative to reorient scientific and technological achievements from military purposes to peaceful aims. The work of the Ad hoc Committee has been useful in deepening and increasing understanding of the complexity of the entire problem, in increasing awareness of a commonality of interests and the need for a multilateralization of the effort. But the Committee cannot do a little more of the same each year. It is high time, therefore, to pass on to the next stage of substantive work, which, at this moment in our view, should be focused on strengthening the present legal régime, expanding and improving it. The present legal régime is not sufficient to cope with the diversity of aspects connected with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It should be supplemented and enlarged.

The significant number of extremely important proposals and initiatives for further work in the Conference has been compiled through the remarkable efforts of both the present and former chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee. Work in the CD should not be seen to contradict the very important bilateral talks on the issue. The problem is universal and must be globally dealt with.

To conclude, I would like to stress that we can make up for lost time if we strive for rational use of the available time to address the substantive issues with renewed commitment and purposeful effort. The Conference, as the only multilateral negotiating body, plays a central and unique role, responsibility for which is in our own hands. We cannot avoid this responsibility by making reference, as we have in the past, to the unfavourable international situation or to an over-complexity of issues. The

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international community is knowledgeable and mature enough to differentiate between genuine commitments and real problems. In the first week of September the ninth summit meeting with heads of State and government of non-aligned countries is taking place in Belgrade. The meeting, which will gather together the greater part of the international community, will no doubt benevolently scrutinize our output and support our efforts, but also remind us of our responsibility to negotiate and reach agreements.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker is the representative of Canada, His Excellency the Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs, Mr. Fred Bild, whom I would like to welcome warmly on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, thanking him for his interest in our work. I give the floor to the representative of Canada.

Mr. BILD (Canada): As this is the first opportunity I have had of addressing the Conference on Disarmament, I ask for your forbearance if my remarks do not always reflect this body's day-to-day concerns. I should like, however, to provide a Canadian perspective of the course which CD has set for itself and the manner in which it is following it.

It is time we took stock of the multilateral arms control and disarmament process. It seems to me that we may be approaching a crise de crédibilité with our publics in the way disarmament issues are dealt with on an international level. No one doubts the dedication, patience and integrity of the people who study, discuss and negotiate these matters on behalf of their countries. But, in the best tradition of self-criticism, perhaps we should see whether, in the ceaseless round of discussions, meetings, deliberations and negotiations in the various multilateral forums, we are not somehow engaged in a faster and faster dance than in the process of advancing the dialectic. Instead of attempting to achieve a higher level of unity by reconciling opposites and revealing the truths of the underlying idea, it may seem to the man in the street that the dance just swirls on, frenetically. I don't wish to overtax this metaphor, but it seems somehow an appropriate way of interpreting events of the last while.

Many of the distinguished representatives present here will have shared my disappointment at the failure of last year's UNSSOD-III to achieve agreement. At what point does the failure to reach agreement at large, highly publicized meetings begin to call the effort itself into question? The paucity of results at most recent meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in the wake of the disappointing outcome of UNSSOD-III, cannot help but feed the public's scepticism as to the value of these meetings.

Against this, we have witnessed the gratifying thaw in East-West relations. The super-Power relationship seems well poised to reach further accommodation in creating a framework of mutual security. Recent developments in the conventional force reduction negotiations just under way in Vienna have shown dramatically what can be achieved among sovereign States when the spirit of compromise infuses and directs disparate political wills. The CFE talks will be no MBFR. Agreement was forged in a setting where all joined in a quest for a common position from which to address the largest security

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transition since the end of the Second World War. They are embarking on a venture that seeks to supplant the military confrontation in central Europe with defensive systems restructured into few units with regulated and reduced offensive capabilities.

Admittedly, these are early days but, the commitment by the NATO countries, led by President Bush's suggestion for an accelerated timetable, to get moving in negotiations with Warsaw Pact Organization member States gives one hope that disarmament is not the preserve of only the utopian and the idealist. What we are seeing is the effort of the pragmatist to translate noble aspirations into reality. It is the pragmatist who sees the pay-off in disarmament, not just in its promised economic benefits but also in a heightened sense of security - mutual security. The relevance of these comments to the present meeting is that we are watching in Vienna an unfolding of a multilateral arms control and disarmament process which promises to refute those who argue that only in bilateral arrangements can a country work out a satisfactory security relationship with a potential adversary.

We must also recognize, however, that the quest for disarmament should not be too far in advance of what relevant political conditions can sustain. Until those conditions are dealt with, until, that is, determination is shown by all parties involved to bring their mutual understanding and political accommodation to a level where practical steps towards arms control or actual disarmament can take place, our sights must be lowered somewhat to the level of confidence-building. It is still pertinent to recall the familiar observation that one must learn to walk before one can begin to run. The achievement of the Stockholm Conference provided a salutary lesson in this regard. The accord reached in September 1986 on confidence - and security-building measures in Europe ushered in an era of greater transparency and openness between military blocs without excluding the neutral and non-aligned States of the region. In so doing, it set the stage for the conventional force reductions we all hope will be the outcome of the CFE negotiations. If these actually manage to bring about the destruction of military equipment before international observers, as proposed, we shall finally have achieved multilateral disarmament without any lessening of security. There is another aspect to the legacy of Stockholm we must not forget: it successfully incorporated short-notice challenge inspection to verify compliance with the provisions of the agreement. The acceptance of such powerful verficiation measures in support of greater transparency in military activities has provided us with a practical, workable recipe for building confidence on a multilateral basis.

Verification and transparency are two subjects that have formed a central part of the Canadian Government's approach to multilateral arms control and disarmament. They are central elements in the building of confidence and consensus. It will come as no surprise, I am sure, to the distinguished representatives to this Conference that verification ranks high in our priorities. Canada has endeavoured through its Verification Research Programme to contribute in an effective way to the very foundation of modern arms control. Some of the studies we have initiated have looked at technical problems associated with various methods of verification, while others have sought to clarify the conceptual basis of verification, bearing in mind that

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much will depend on the type of arms control and disarmament to be verified. Ambassador Marchand's plenary statement last March illustrated this approach through mention of the projects we have pursued in the past and those we are currently pursuing. I shall not repeat them in detail here.

I should like, however, to add several points on verification as it pertains to multilateral arms control and disarmament. In 1985, attention was initially focused on this subject in the United Nations General Assembly through a Canadian initiative which led to the adoption by consensus of a resolution (40/152 O) which crystallized the increasing world-wide awareness of the importance of verification in facilitating the negotiating process. Since then, this awareness has grown and become more sophisticated. For example, the United Nations Disarmament Commission during 1987 and 1988 developed a set of general principles of verification. We call them "the 16 principles". The forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, after some false starts, called for a study by the Secretary-General on the role of the United Nations in verification. This led to the setting up of a group of experts from 20 countries who started their work in February this year. They paid me the honour of electing me Chairman; I in turn have pledged to them that I shall spare no effort in guiding our work to a fruitful conclusion. The Group's acceptance of the 16 principles as a foundation for its work was a positive development. As one might well expect, the exact nature of our recommendations cannot be determined at this early stage of our work. But progress so far has been good, and I remain optimistic that we shall produce a report that is technically competent, politically realistic and one which will strengthen the multilateral arms control process and the United Nations itself.

Allow me at this point to offer some thoughts on how multilateral verification and the quest for greater transparency and openness surrounding military activities can come together to build confidence. Last month, President Bush unveiled a proposal for "open skies". It would involve, as the name suggests, opening a country's national airspace to short-notice overflights by unarmed aircraft, on the basis of reciprocity. The proposal has been laid out in bilateral terms, involving the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union. President Bush, however, clearly indicated that the proposal could easily be reworked to include member States of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. At the moment, "open skies" is seen as a confidence-building measure independent of any specific arms control or disarmament agreement. It seeks to improve transparency and openness in a way that is accessible to all countries. Highly sophisticated satellite technology would not be required. Nor would any information be gathered that would not be similarly available to other countries, especially in the area of most concern to all: military preparations for surprise attack and offensive action.

The merits of "open skies" are clear to the Canadian Government. When a similar kind of proposal was put forward as early as 1955 by President Eisenhower, we supported it. Indeed, we continued in following years to suggest that Canadian airspace - in particular the Canadian northern and Arctic regions - would be offered for inclusion if the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on an "open skies" idea as a confidence-building measure against the threat of surprise attack. Today there are added reasons

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for supporting the proposal, not least of which is its potential use in verifying conventional forces reduction agreements. Aircraft surveillance, for instance, would make it harder to hide military movements or non-compliance with arms control agreements. There would be other advantages from the resulting transparency. I shall not rehearse them all at the moment, except for their relevance to the multilateral disarmament process. "Open skies" would, for example, allow all parties to an agreement to participate fully in arms control verification and monitoring; it would allow for continuous monitoring to prevent a rapid clandestine military build-up and to maintain confidence that a surprise attack was not being planned. The obligation to comply with the acceptance of such overflights, on a reciprocal and agreed basis, could be specifically built into the arms control or disarmament treaty eventually signed. One could even imagine that this formula might be adapted to provide needed transparency in other parts of the world subject to regional tensions.

Despite its 34-year-old vintage, I find this idea innovative in its simplicity yet appropriate to some of the multilateral verification issues we encounter in our discussions both here and at the United Nations. I urge all CD member States to give the "open skies" proposal the thoughtful and serious study it so clearly deserves at a time when transparency and verification need to be joined more intimately in disarmament forums.

With these reflections in mind, I turn briefly to the specific issues before us at the CD, starting with agenda item 4 - chemical weapons. Over the past two years, agreement has been reached on vitally important issues relating to verification, methods and timetables for CW destruction, and declarations in advance of a treaty. The next few steps - hammering out the details - will not by their very nature give the appearance of dramatic progress. But appearances cannot be a substitute for real, if slower and more arduous, headway in completing the draft convention before us. The key lies in keeping the negotiations free from artificial deadlines and from the inclination to force issues ahead of what consensus can sustain. Progress over the next session will be step-by-step and will depend on appropriate attention to detail. I commend the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, in facilitating this progress through his well-focused and practical work programme.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the 16 verification principles agreed by consensus at the UNDC constitute the corner-stone of an emerging common approach to disarmament. This consensus must be protected and nourished to allow its roots to sink deeply into the multilateral disarmament process. Naturally, these roots, as they develop, will become more intertwined and complex, but this is true of any firmly established system. We should not be dismayed at the prospect of complexity in verification. The question is how we can carry out practically and effectively that which has been agreed in principle and by all member States of the Conference.

In the modern age, arms control and disarmament have become, to the surprise of some, perhaps, increasingly reliant on short-notice, on-site inspection. The feature is found in the United States/Soviet Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, as well as in the multilateral Stockholm

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accord on confidence- and security-building measures. Both agreements have been successfully implemented and fully complied with, a result, I would argue, to a large measure attributable to the possibility of such inspections.

Allow me to amplify these remarks by applying them to the draft chemical weapons convention. I find it difficult to imagine that any future disarmament treaties can be reached without the prospect of potentially intrusive international verification. Should this be alarming or a cause for disquiet? Not at all. We should always bear in mind that no verification measures will come into play without their being carefully tailored to the requirements of the treaty at hand. Moreover, co-operation and consensus over these details will make the intrusiveness of international on-site inspection into a means of assuring all concerned that the treaty is being fully complied with by the parties.

I have heard it suggested that in the case of the chemical weapons convention, requests for challenge inspections would generate political sensitivities and suggestions of guilt. This outlook misconstrues the objective of such inspections. They need not be regarded as provocative, but rather as confidence-inspiring. Until such time as experience and technology permit more systematic methods of inspection to carry the full load of verification, I submit that challenge inspections will be de rigueur in virtually all disarmament treaties, the chemical weapons convention being one of the more prominent. What we could be encountering is an "attitudinal" problem, a problem that can be overcome as long as we keep our eyes firmly on the following: first, an essential concern of the convention is to ensure that international inspectors have access to any facility where clandestine activities might be undertaken; second, the essential obligation is on the challenged State to demonstrate its compliance, and not on the requesting State to prove non-compliance. As we have all indicated an abiding interest in a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention, this objective in regard to verification should be fully embraced, with the obligations willingly, indeed cheerfully, shouldered. There is thus no reason to shrink back in fear. Since we have already agreed with the UNDC conclusion that the request for inspection not carry with it implications of guilt but rather be considered a normal element of verification, let us put this "attitudinal" problem behind us and move to a more practical, less anxious understanding of what challenge inspections imply.

By the same token, we should not venerate challenge inspections as the "be-all and end-all" of chemical weapons verification. Careful thought should be given to elaborating a verification régime that would avoid unnecessary recourse to the challenge provision. Indeed, we can also explore other avenues, perhaps by making challenge inspections as "routine" as possible; by keeping them as multilteral as possible in execution and reporting of findings; and by allowing as much flexibility as possible in solving compliance problems to everybody's satisfaction through other means. These other means could include, inter alia, mutually agreed bilateral measures, fact-finding "clarification visits" or other means of demonstrating clarification short of invoking the challenge provisions. I have every confidence that, with ingenuity and perseverance, the Ad hoc Committee will find a way to accommodate the concern over intrusive on-site challenge inspection without jeopardizing the integrity of the "mandatory, short-notice" principle.

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Let me now turn to the issue of a comprehensive test ban. Ambassador Marchand outlined Canada's position in his March statement. We consider Ambassador Vejvoda's compromise proposal as the one which offers the greatest promise of a basis for consensus. We look forward to hearing from those who have remained silent in that regard. But let us again step back for a moment and survey the scene as we end the Second Disarmament Decade. Here we are, on the one hand, stalemated in reaching agreement on a mandate which would allow us to discuss the important issue of a nuclear test ban. All of us have indicated, at one time or another, either unreservedly or with qualifications, our belief that a negotiated comprehensive nuclear test ban is desirable and achievable. Realism, however, suggests that we cannot allow our expectations on a ban to outstrip what is politically feasible or technically achievable. Again, the need for candour brings us to an uncomfortable prospect: that achieving a test ban, even if it could be done overnight, may not prevent the development of nuclear explosive devices and their possible use in a future conflict, regardless of their being untested. Looking this squarely in the eye is indeed disconcerting.

We in Canada can well understand the frustration of many States at the slow progress in achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but we do not think that it is wise to try to resolve this issue through the back door, so to speak. As you all know, there is an active move afoot to amend an existing treaty - the partial test-ban treaty - to achieve a CTB. Those who favour this course should consider carefully the longer-term implications of this move for the whole multilateral disarmament process. Forcing arms control and disarmament treaties to be opened up for radical amendment is a dangerous game, especially if there is no pre-existing consensus for this among the treaty's signatories. The very future of the existing agreement may be placed in jeopardy. Even more disconcerting is the apparent readiness of at least some to tie this call for a PTBT amendment conference to the future continuation of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Any such efforts should be firmly resisted. I cannot think of a better example of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. To threaten to bring down the corner-stone of the nuclear non-proliferation régime in the quest for an amendment which, however well intentioned, in reality gives no promise of producing a global, comprehensive and verifiable test ban is, quite simply, irresponsible.

What we can do, however, is to remain relentless and single-minded in preparing the ground for a test ban. Until such time as the nuclear Powers are persuaded that a ban is in their security interests, pleas for negotiations will fall on stony ground. Yet this is no excuse for being unprepared when circumstances change, as I am hopeful they will. The trepidation the nuclear Powers and the rest of us will undoubtedly feel in taking tentative steps into the post-nuclear-weapon era will largely be assuaged by assurances that no one is cheating. That is why improvement and refinement of our ability to monitor adequately such a ban should remain paramount on the multilateral disarmament agenda. We need to continue energetically experimentation with, and testing of, seismic data exchanges. Only by improving the expertise and co-ordination with which seismic events can be globally monitored will a level of verification be reached that is comforting and assuring to all. Let us not be caught in a position where the nuclear Powers are ready to call a halt to their testing but the required verification instruments are not yet in place.

(Mr. Bild, Canada)

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is something that we all wish to achieve. The march of technology is relentless: more and more countries are developing know-how and the means to send rockets with satellites, space probes and other scientific instruments into space. Our task is to try and assure our publics that these activities, even ones carried out under military auspices, are for purposes that contribute to, not detract from, international security. But before a start can be made in this regard, we must know what international security means as it relates to the uses of space. International security, as Ambassador Marchand has recently pointed out, implies not only the absence of weapons as such in outer space, it entails the responsibility of the two major space Powers to maintain a stable, controlled relationship between themselves on space issues. This means that all efforts to consider the relationship between international security and outer space are predicated on the enhancement of stability. It is our job to identify measures concerning the use of outer space that can be taken on a multilateral basis and through consensus, and that will enhance stability - admittedly a daunting task. That is all the more reason to ensure that the first step provides a strong building block from which further proposals can proceed.

Let me reiterate the contention already put foward by the Canadian delegation. Much more attention has to be given to the basic framework involved in the use of space. The current régime on outer space, comprising a number of international agreements and treaties, can be strengthened: we can search for agreement on the definition of key terms, clarify the issue of stability and, in general, thereby set up a solid foundation to guide our work in the coming years. We could make a start, for example, in applying principles of transparency to activities in space by urging more States to sign the registration Convention and by persuading the parties to the registration Convention to agree to provide more timely and specific information on the functions of the satellites they launch, including whether specific satellites are intended to fulfil civilian, military or combined functions.

As I am sure you are all aware, Canada is ready and eager to move forward on the negotiation of a treaty banning radiological weapons. We have had a draft before us for many years now. Yet any possibility of advance has been side-tracked by issues which, while important in themselves, are not, in our estimation, fundamental to reaching agreement on banning a new form of weapons of mass destruction. We need not reiterate the arguments that have brought us to this impasse: rather, let us stand back and put things once again in their proper perspective. What will this impasse do to all our other endeavours? Will it not undermine the credibility of the multilateral process?

Fortunately, radiological weapons do not at present exist. Simple logic would dictate that now is the time to prevent their future development by agreeing to a comprehensive and effective ban. To some, it may seem a hollow victory that a weapon that does not exist is being prohibited. But look at the other examples of international treaties that have sought, implicitly, if not explicitly, to cut off a potential development before it can take root. We have examples before us: The Antarctic Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the sea-bed Treaty, the environmental modification treaty.

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On a bilateral basis, the anti-ballistic missile Treaty prevents the development, testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and their components, whether based on current or future technological principles. Many States would concur that blocking the unilateral deployment of ABM systems through this Treaty constitutes a corner-stone of nuclear arms control between the super-Powers and helps give the whole process its legitimacy. I would argue that a treaty on radiological weapons would contribute in a similar fashion to the legitimacy, as well as the credibility, of the multilateral disarmament process and should be viewed from this more positive perspective.

It strikes me that the forward strides the United States and USSR are beginning to make bilaterally in arms control and disarmament, and those which we may yet see over the next years in the multilateral process at Vienna, serve both as an encouragement to the work being done here in Geneva and as a strict reminder that the international spotlight may focus even more directly on the Conference on Disarmament as a result. We have received a taste of this kind of attention over the past year as world concern mounted over the use of chemical weapons. Similarly, international anxiety is bound to keep growing over arms build-ups in numerous regions of the world, over new types of weapons, new areas of deployment (including outer space), and over the renewed use of weapons we had long hoped would never be used again. The world will thus ask this body pointed questions and will expect it to offer meaningful results. Yet we must protect the multilateral arms control process from excessive demands, remembering the old adage that the best is often the enemy of the good. We cannot ask the arms control process to resolve all the problems, or carry all the burden of existing political differences. Let us work assiduously to allow the CD to begin achieving what in principle it ought to be able to achieve: maintenance and enhancement of the credibility of the multilateral disarmament process. We cannot let this credibility slip away.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Canada for the statement with which he has contributed to our discussions. And now I give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): At the outset, Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you upon your assumption of your high office. I do this with particular pleasure as you are representing a country with which the German Democratic Republic enjoys close and friendly relations. Your accession to the post of President of the Conference reflects the significant part Mexico is playing in the struggle for peace, disarmament and equal co-operation between States and peoples. Your accession also mirrors the personal commitment you display in the quest for arms limitation and disarmament, which is highly valued by my delegation. I have pleasant memories when I think of the time we worked together in New York in the mid-1970s, which is being continued here in Geneva. I wish you much success in the discharge of your responsible duties, and can assure you of my delegation's fullest support in this endeavour.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

A less pleasant duty is to note with regret the departure of Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina, as well as Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, who, as we all know, had to accomplish a particularly responsible task at the beginning of our Conference. I wish them success in their new assignments.

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament is entering its second round. Notwithstanding all the complexities and contradictions of the situation, quite a few propitious developments have taken place since the spring part of this session. Yesterday, the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons were resumed, in a very welcome event. We expect them to produce concrete results in the form of 50 per cent cuts in Soviet and American strategic offensive weapons. It was a few days ago that the Soviet Union and the United States again started their bilateral consultations on chemical weapons. We are convinced that they will generate a decisive impetus for concluding the negotiations on a convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date.

The proposal by the Warsaw Treaty States that separate negotiations be taken up on tactical nuclear arms in Europe lies on the table. We advocate the commencement of such talks within a reasonable period of time, with no undue delay. Linkages are not very helpful in this context. In our view, developments in the correlation of military forces and the situation in the field of nuclear disarmament necessitate the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has declared its readiness, in agreement with its allies, to withdraw all nuclear warheads from their territories by the year 1991, provided that the United States of America takes a similar step. This is, in fact, a significant approach.

The appeal made by the Warsaw Treaty States to the member States of NATO in May this year has lost nothing of its topicality. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are implementing the unilateral disarmament measures announced by them. This convincingly reaffirms their resolve not to allow any hiatus to occur in the disarmament process. It concerns a total of at least 581,300 troops, 12,751 tanks, 10,030 artillery systems, 1,010 combat aircraft and 895 armoured vehicles, as well as some tactical nuclear systems. We hope that other States will come up with similar moves.

The positive start to the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe as well as on confidence- and security-building measures is encouraging in our opinion. Both sides have tabled substantive documents.

The German Democratic Republic regards the results of the NATO summit as a step in the right direction, as the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, stated only recently. We welcome the fact that the American proposals respond to the initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty for the inclusion of aircraft, helicopters and numerical strength in the reduction process and the scrapping of weapons systems to be dismantled. This attitude comes close to our striving for radical conventional disarmament. To expedite the Vienna negotiations on conventional armaments fully complies with our interests.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The summer session of the Conference is thus starting its work under favourable circumstances. Now it is incumbent upon all of us to seize the chance offered within the coming 10 weeks and render a substantial contribution towards visibly advancing the process of disarmament now under way. We should not allow the global field of disarmament, i.e. its multilateral dimension, to fall behind the requirements. The German Democratic Republic takes the view that the Conference should enter into a result-oriented dialogue and proceed to negotiations, where possible. Furthermore, current negotiations should come to a conclusion very soon. We favour translating the constructive and business-like atmosphere into concrete action.

We all know how things stand at the moment. We know about the deficiencies. But we are also cognizant of the possibilities that need to be exploited to arrive at constructive solutions regarding the pending contentious issues. Meaningful steps have, in fact, been undertaken to intensify the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I share the views on this subject expressed this morning by Ambassador Kosin. In addition, however, we feel that it is now high time to focus more attention on the outstanding essential questions. In this respect, we are thinking in particular of the following: finalizing the provisions on challenge inspections, agreeing on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities, and reaching understanding on the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council of the future Organization. The German Democratic Republic is prepared to make a distinctive contribution during the summer session.

To ensure the speediest conclusion of the convention, as agreed upon in Paris, let me also refer to the suggestion for a meeting of the Conference at foreign minister level. If it is deemed possible to reach agreement in Vienna within six months or one year, then there is all the more reason to consider that the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention constitutes a realistic goal.

The improved political conditions should enable the Conference to finally stride ahead in the field of nuclear disarmament. The proposals put forward by the USSR in 1986 and by India in 1988 on the phased elimination of nuclear weapons, the working paper on nuclear disarmament presented by a group of socialist States in New York in May this year, as well as the resolutions of the General Assembly relating to this item would, in our view, be suitable projects to begin with. This is especially true of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Here lies the key to curbing the nuclear arms race and considerably restricting the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons. We believe that practical work should be centred on verification. The German Democratic Republic has submitted proposals to this end. Our delegation will continue to do so in future. The establishment of a committee on a nuclear test ban deserves our unqualified support.

And may I add another idea? Should it not be the task of the Conference to make an essential contribution to the elaboration of principles governing nuclear disarmament? In this context, we have in mind the following:

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The interrelationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, in particular between a drastic cut in the strategic offensive weapons of the United States of America and the USSR and the halting of the build-up of nuclear armaments by other nuclear-weapon States. What would have to be taken into account in this respect is the interrelationship between the different levels of nuclear armaments - strategic, intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons;

The interrelationship between nuclear disarmament and other areas of disarmament, e.g. to reduce conventional armed forces and prevent an arms race in outer space;

Discussion of collateral measures of nuclear disarmament. They include the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from foreign territory, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, measures to forestall a nuclear war, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In our opinion, the overall problem of nuclear disarmament also comprises the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. At this juncture, let me point to the recently announced decision by the Soviet Union to halt the production of highly enriched uranium intended for military purposes and to decommission two more plutonium reactors.

Such conceptual problems could become topics of informal meetings of the CD's plenary. The German Democratic Republic supports the resumption of these meetings.

The demand for greater precision in terms of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is equally important. Our delegation advocates that the discussion in the outer space Committee should be conducted in a more structured and intensive manner, with experts being involved. A step-by-step approach to the factual problems seems practicable in this respect. Here we have in mind the consideration of confidence-building measures providing for the protection of outer space objects, as advanced, inter alia, by France and the Federal Republic of Germany in connection with a "code of conduct" and "rules of the road". This approach also encompasses the proposals made by socialist States and non-aligned countries concerning agreements on the prohibition of anti-satellite and other outer space weapons. We have repeatedly undertaken initiatives in this field, and will continue to develop them further.

Those are my reflections on the work of the summer session.
Mr. President, permit me to make a concluding remark. In the course of the previous debate, the issue of social orders was occasionally raised. I believe that only if we respect each other as we are, only if we stick to the mandate and subject of the Conference, if we place the main emphasis on questions which will help make headway in disarmament, will it be possible to bring about sober-minded co-operation. What we want is co-operation that is benefical to all those involved and in which everybody takes a share. We do not seek more - but we will not accept less.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): A fortunate coincidence in our calendar gives me the opportunity to make my farewell statement to this Conference on Disarmament under the presidency of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, who in July 1985 also welcomed me in his capacity as representative of Mexico. Thus, at the time when I took up my duties as representative of my country at the Conference on Disarmament, as well as when taking my leave of it, I have found myself under the auspices of the person who is to the highest degree recognized as a champion of the cause of disarmament.

Mr. President, I shall not embark on a panegyric to your qualities. World public opinion already has a very definite idea of your outstanding services for a peaceful world through disarmament. Allow me simply to express my pleasure at this fortunate circumstance which has given me the opportunity to join the Conference on Disarmament under your auspices and to take my leave of it today under your guidance.

The passage of time has brought me to the end of four years as representative of the Argentine Republic to the Conference on Disarmament. I arrived in July 1985, and I must say that in this Conference I have had the opportunity to appreciate in advance the major changes that are taking place today in international life. The question of disarmament, like no other, unequivocally reveals the intent of States in their international conduct. Security is the highest value in the life of any country, and attitudes to disarmament are telling indicators of an international trend at a given stage.

In these four years we have had the opportunity from the Conference on Disarmament to observe the gradual abandonment of the attitude of confrontation which had prevailed since the end of the Second World War, and the start of a promising stage of peaceful co-operation between the great Powers. In 1985, here in Geneva, the meeting took place between the then President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The statement issued by Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev on 20 November 1985 indicated that, through the improvement in the relationship between these two major Powers, prospects were opened up for a stage of peaceful co-operation in international life. Subsequently, a series of bilateral negotiations were held here in Geneva on nuclear weapons and in Stockholm and Vienna on confidence-building measures between the two major military alliances, in addition to other summit meetings which helped to stretch out the current phase of international developments. Furthermore, the statements at the plenary meetings of this Conference which we heard from heads of Government and foreign ministers of many countries carried a clear message which reflected the international climate which was emerging, with a definite profile of détente. In particular, one could perceive in these statements an intention of solving regional conflicts in the form of a reaffirmed determination to resolve them through political means, abandoning recourse to armed confrontation.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

In these four years, the Conference on Disarmament has been an extremely valuable look-out post, which has enabled us to anticipate events and to keep the men who have political responsibilities in our country informed concerning the peaceful co-operation which prevails today in international life with the disappearance of the threat of the outbreak of the Third World War, which in the last four decades has periodically haunted the destiny of mankind.

Even though this might appear to be a concept which falls outside the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, I cannot fail to point out that the prospects for consolidation of this peaceful stage in international life inevitably correspond with the progressive strengthening of democratic institutions and the flowering of freedoms and respect for human rights. Nor can I fail to point out that, paradoxically, the dark shadow of the unjust distribution of wealth in the world continues to fall on relations among men when a vast population suffers from basic hardships whereas some sectors of mankind enjoy the privilege of abundance and opulence.

Despite this picture we have described in general terms, which prompts encouraging and well-founded hopes for world peace for the coming years, we cannot fail to express our concern at the lack of progress in the multilateral framework in which the question of disarmament is being dealt with. For many years there has been no concrete progress within the Conference on Disarmament. We recognize that intensive negotiations are taking place to conclude a convention which will ban chemical weapons once and for all, and we are certainly aware of the technical difficulties which have to be resolved. It is clear that, over and above their undeniable complexity, the technical problems will be overcome in so far as there is a real political will to conclude the convention. Strictly speaking, in sum, only these negotiations in the area of chemical weapons may be noted as a specific prospect in the multilateral field of the United Nations. But within a broader framework, and ominously, we must also note the failure of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held a year ago at United Nations Headquarters in New York. To retrieve for the United Nations the exercise of competence in the field of disarmament is an aim which should be borne in mind by member States in their immediate actions.

It is recognized by all that international life has acquired a degree of interdependence that requires from all States active participation in the management of interests shared by man on the Planet Earth which is his habitat. No one can dispute that it is legitimate for all the members of the international community to participate in decisions which have a bearing on the management of these common interests of mankind. Intercourse among nations is increasingly involved in subjects proper to big cities. International life is becoming increasingly citified because its problems are beginning to be the same as those affecting cities. There is, for instance, a real concern that all countries share in respect of common problems such as the equitable distribution of wealth in the world, the pollution of the Earth's environment in terms of the atmosphere, the seas, or the dumping of industrial wastes.

What are these subjects if not matters of municipal administration? The fact is that the world is increasingly just one big city. It is our opinion that at the present time Governments are tackling the problem of organizing

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

this international life, which is so close-knit and intricate, either through the participation of all States or, alternatively, through the unilateral self-assignment of this mission on the part of a group of major countries which by themselves and for themselves assume the role of protectors of the international common good. The question of disarmament, like many of these common concerns which we have pointed to, is of interest to all countries without exception. However, multilateral efforts to deal with it have not prospered. Nor has there seemed to be any progress in the handling of this international common good to which we have referred, on a basis of democracy and participation by all States on an equal footing. The international system must decide whether it is going to be democratic or not.

The Conference on Disarmament is an area which very clearly reflects the trends that we have developed above. All the delegates present here have a clear assessment as to the obstacles which obstruct the progress of our negotiations. Having said this, it is necessary to recognize that, in addition to the indispensable political will, our negotiations, by their very nature, require a great effort of imagination to reconcile the mosaic of diverse interests existing between different countries and regions on the five continents. In this regard, I have in mind the testimony of the great professional effort renewed daily throughout the session of the Conference on Disarmament by representatives accredited here in the search for solutions compatible with these very diverse interests.

This sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament is vital in the search for solutions to the grave problems that threaten peace. In our first statement before the United Nations General Assembly in 1985, in introducing the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament in our capacity as President, we said that none of the political trends currently at work in the world can do without this organ, as it represents a major step in the development of appropriate international arrangements for the adoption of measures to promote general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It is worth mentioning that around the negotiating table of the Conference on Disarmament the five nuclear-weapon Powers are seated. Moreover, the group of non-aligned and neutral countries has a numerical majority which is approximately in keeping with their representativeness within the international community. It should also not be forgotten that the Conference on Disarmament is the first multilateral negotiating body to have taken up the responsibility of including in its agenda the consideration of essential measures to halt the arms race. The Conference on Disarmament is important for the non-aligned and neutral countries, because those who, without being the authors, would nevertheless fall victim to the consequences of a global conflict, can make their voices heard here. It is also important for them because it secures their participation in decisions relating to their technological independence and international co-operation in this field. The active presence of the neutral and non-aligned countries at this Conference offers the possibility of working in favour of understanding and for a convergence of positions between the military alliances, not as mediators, but as independent and responsible partners.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

The Conference on Disarmament is also important for the nuclear-weapon Powers and for those which have opted for membership of military alliances, as the Conference on Disarmament in its continuity offers a forum in which peace and security can be protected. As militarily significant States, the members of those alliances have a primary responsibility for preserving peace and contributing to the cessation of the arms race in all its aspects. The Conference on Disarmament, let us remember, is the sole multilateral forum that, by virtue of its nature as a negotiating body, has power to endorse the agreements of the international community as a whole in the field of disarmament.

Today, on the occasion of taking our leave, we would like to express the hope that the climate of international détente will be exploited through the conclusion of disarmament agreements of more ambitious scope which will help to consolidate peace and international security once and for all, both in the relation between the major Powers and wherever, even today, situations generating regional tensions still exist.

Finally, I must say to my colleagues present here that it is not my intention to convey the idea that I am saying good-bye for ever. On the contrary, nothing will give me greater pleasure than to follow the work of the Conference on Disarmament closely and, if possible, renew my occasional presence here.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Cámpora, the representative of Argentina, for the statement with which he has contributed to our discussions, and very particularly for his generous words addressed to the Chair. I am sure I will be expressing the feelings of all my colleagues if I say how much we will miss his presence and how pleased we were to hear of his plans to renew his occasional presence in the Conference, as he put it.

I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak? It seems not. Consequently, I should like to inform you that after consulting the distinguished representative of Argentina and my fellow officers, we thought that the reception planned for noon today could be brought forward by a quarter of an hour, so as to start at 11.45 a.m. This would accommodate the distinguished representative of Argentina, who, as you will understand, has many urgent tasks to perform, as have some of us. Accordingly, the reception in the Salon tchèque will begin at 11.45 a.m. instead of 12 noon.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.511
22 June 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 June 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)

GE.89-61555/0705B

The PRESIDENT: The 511th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

First of all, I should like to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who will be following our work today. In so doing I should like to thank him for his efficient and active co-operation with this single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and his willingness to support the additional requirements arising from Conference activities.

Today the Conference continues its consideration of agenda items 1 and 2, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Sri Lanka. I now call on the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to welcome you as the President of our Conference. The Soviet delegation is particularly pleased to see in this important post the representative of the friendly State of Mexico, an outstanding diplomat and a Nobel Peace Prize winner. Allow me also to express our gratitude to the representative of Kenya, Ambassador Bullut, who chaired the Conference during the last month of its spring 1989 session.

In the period since the completion of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament a series of important developments have taken place which have the most direct bearing on the problems under consideration here. I think you will understand me if at the outset I say a few words about an event of crucial significance primarily but not exclusively for my country, the Congress of People's Deputies. The Congress was both a result of the process of perestroika, which began four years ago, and a fundamentally new stage in its development. It is leading us to new frontiers of democracy and glasnost, and the implementation of the principle of pluralism of opinions. These were 12 days which shook a great deal in the minds of Soviet people and their perception of themselves and their country. The results of the Congress bear witness to a shift from the long years of despotic rule of an administrative and command system to a normal, politically open life. Of course, serious tests await us, and this was reconfirmed by the Congress. There are problems connected with shortcomings in political education, the inadequacy of protective machinery in the functioning of democracy. The Congress has provided the whole of Soviet society with an exceptionally broad range of lessons and rich food for thought and for future work in developing the process of perestroika.

We consider perestroika as part of the growing democratization of the whole world order, and as the Soviet Union's contribution to the solution of the global problems facing mankind. And it is no accident that the Congress of People's Deputies has adopted a message to the peoples of the world which maps out the political strategy of the Soviet State and sets out the principles governing its foreign policy in accordance with the new political thinking. These principles include in particular a provision to the effect

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that the security of a country should be guaranteed first of all by political means, as a component of overall and equal security in the process of demilitarization, democratization and humanization of international relations, the need to eliminate nuclear weapons through negotiations oriented towards disarmament and the reduction of the defence potential of States to levels of reasonable sufficiency, and the inadmissibility of the use of force or the threat of force. These principles will also underpin Soviet policy in the field of disarmament, which is based on the fact that the nature of current weaponry does not give a single State grounds to hope that it can defend itself solely using military technology, and that consequently the arms race is as fruitless as it is absurd.

The continuation of this race on Earth, and a fortiori its extension into outer space, can serve only to step up the already critically high rate of accumulation and sophistication of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. Today's realities show that not just nuclear war itself, or any other war, but even preparations for such a war - in other words the arms race and the desire to achieve military superiority - cannot objectively bring any political or any other gain to anyone. The underpinning and in a way the guarantee of our policy in the field of disarmament is the new Soviet military doctrine, which has an unequivocally defensive orientation. The content of this doctrine, like the specific tasks of the armed forces of the USSR and the nature of military development, tactical and strategic plans and policy concerning weapons and equipment - in a word, all our decisions and actions in the field of national defence - are determined by the obligations of the USSR not to initiate military action against any other State unless we ourselves are the subject of aggression, and never, under any circumstances, to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The structural reorganization of the armed forces of the USSR currently taking place is directing the fundamental orientation of our military doctrine towards imparting a strictly defensive character to those forces and towards their future evolution on the basis of reasonable defensive sufficiency. In practical terms we consider that this principle of defensive sufficiency involves giving the armed forces of the USSR a non-offensive structure, placing a ceiling on the proportion of attack components in those forces, making changes in their deployment with a view to fulfilling strictly defensive tasks, lowering the parameters governing mobilization of the armed forces and reducing the volume of military production. In keeping with the new Soviet military doctrine we are reviewing many of our programmes of military technology and reducing our plans for the development of weapons and equipment. We are now discontinuing a number of projects involving the use of strike and offensive weapons systems.

Distinguished delegates are of course aware of the plans for unilateral reductions by the Soviet Union in its armed forces and armaments, including those on the territory of our allies. These plans are now at the implementation stage. Thus by 15 August of this year, out of the groups of Soviet troops deployed in the allied States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, 3 tank divisions will be withdrawn (2 from the German Democratic Republic and 1 from Hungary), 24 tactical missile launchers, about 2,700 tanks and a significant quantity of other weapons. Between May and August this year one tank division and several other units, including air force units, will be withdrawn from Mongolia.

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The reduction in Soviet defence expenditure in the next two years will result in total savings of nearly 30 billion roubles, and by 1995 we intend to reduce the share of defence expenditure in national income by a third to a half. The accelerated conversion of military production and the release of resources and capacities in order to tackle social and economic goals will take place concurrently. By 1995 the share of civilian goods in the total output of defence industries will reach 60 per cent. This process will go hand in hand with the development of truly democratic, open procedures for the consideration and adoption of military budgets by the USSR Supreme Soviet, including the provision of comprehensive information on actual defence expenditure to the members of the Soviet, thus enabling them to play an active part in the consideration and allocation of military expenditure. At the Congress of People's Deputies the total amount of 77.3 billion roubles for our country's expenditure on defence was made public, together with a breakdown by specific items.

We cannot fail to derive satisfaction from the continuing positive trends in the development of international relations which many speakers before me have referred to here. These trends emerged once again during the May visit to Moscow by United States Secretary of State, James Baker, which we regard as a good beginning to a major undertaking, a serious and substantial dialogue. During the visit, agreement was reached in particular to set in motion once again the Soviet-American machinery for negotiations and consultations on a wide range of arms limitation and disarmament problems, including nuclear and space weapons, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the limitation and cessation of nuclear tests. This is important because in disarmament matters the pace of negotiations is extremely significant, since the forces of inertia and the constraints are considerable. This is why we would like to end the pause in the negotiating process as soon as possible and begin intensive discussion of outstanding issues.

The agreements reached in May are aleady being implemented. The second week of the bilateral Soviet-American discussions on chemical weapons is now drawing to an end. The bilateral negotiations on nuclear tests will be resumed on 26 June. A new round of nuclear and space arms talks has recently opened here in Geneva. The Soviet Union believes that the process of nuclear disarmament which began with the signature of the INF treaty should become irreversible. The next stage in this process is the completion of the Soviet-American negotiations on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive arms while observing the ABM Treaty. The basis for this already exists, and the still outstanding issues in our view are not insurmountable provided that both sides make appropriate efforts.

Further evidence that the Soviet-American dialogue on security matters is being further developed is to be found in the agreement between the Governments of the two countries on the prevention of dangerous military activities which was signed on 12 June in Moscow. Its main purpose was to set up reliable treaty-based machinery to prevent inadvertant and unintentional incidents between their armed forces from growing into military conflict. During the United States Secretary of State's visit to Moscow Mr. Baker had an extremely important meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, at which the Soviet side put forward major proposals aimed at ensuring success at the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe, as well as important

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initiatives on the unilateral reduction of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and a proposal for a comprehensive solution of this issue. We believe that the goal of eliminating tactical nuclear weapons requires dialogue and negotiations, which, together with measures to reduce conventional arms, would lead to the restructuring of armed forces both in the West and in the East on a defensive basis.

We note with satisfaction that for the first time our proposals advanced during the visit of the United States Secretary of State to Moscow were met not with immediate suspicion and criticism but with a serious and concrete response. I have in mind the recent proposals by United States President G. Bush contained in the final documents of the summit meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels. The United States and NATO have agreed to reduce their manpower in Europe. It is encouraging that the NATO side has shown readiness to extend arms reductions to its own offensive systems, instead of requiring us alone to take such measures. On the whole range of numerical parameters - related to tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and combat helicopers - our positions are now close or coincide. An agreement can therefore be achieved at the Vienna negotiations much earlier than previously planned. We also appreciate the acceptance of part of the Soviet proposal on the negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, although we have misgivings about the conditions attached.

In general the spirit of the times is noticeable in the NATO documents, although both the text and the subtext still contain many concepts inherited from the period of confrontation, including those serving ideologically motivated didactic purposes. From time to time they crop up in the discussions at our Conference. The understandings reached between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to that country are of fundamental and long-term significance. We believe that they have imparted new dynamism to the process of East/West co-operation, overcoming the legacy of the "cold war". The joint statement on the results of the visit not only sets out basic approaches to the creation of a Europe of peace and co-operation and the further development of bilateral relations, but in fact puts forward a programme of concrete action in the area of arms limitation and disarmament, including the prohibition of chemical weapons, the cessation of nuclear tests, confidence-building, the development of transparency and the prevention of crises. The foreign ministers agreed on a special statement on the prohibition of chemical weapons aimed at the speedy implementation of the decisions of the Paris Conference.

Of course, everything in the world is interrelated. We will not achieve genuine and radical disarmament without simultaneously changing the political climate on our planet in a drastic way. This includes raising the level of confidence and co-operation, solving the ecological problem and other global problems, changing North-South relations and guaranteeing human rights and the rights of entire nations. But on the other hand, progress in all these areas is hardly possible without disarmament. Likewise, the disarmament process cannot be limited to measures taken in a bilateral or regional framework, however important they might be. Hence the Conference on Disarmament has an irreplaceable role to play in this process. This is also true of the "nuclear items" on the agenda of the Conference. The task of blocking all avenues by which new types and systems of nuclear weapons may be developed and spread

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around the world is of growing significance in the context of an incipient process of real disarmament. The cessation and prohibition of nuclear tests is one of the most effective ways of accomplishing that task.

The Soviet Union consistently advocates the most radical solution to the problem of nuclear tests. Yes, we are a nuclear Power, yet we believe that the cessation of tests is in the interets of universal stability and security, and consequently in our own interests. We stand ready at any time to introduce a moratorium on nuclear explosions together with the United States. However, given the fact that at present the United States is not yet ready for a radical solution to this problem, we have chosen to advance towards that goal step by step. At the Soviet-American negotiations on that issue which resume on 26 June we shall seek to finalize measures for verifying the 1974 and 1976 treaties as soon as possible in order to proceed immediately to the next stage of drawing up agreements on further limitation of the yield and number of tests, with a view to their eventual cessation. However, bilateral negotiations cannot be regarded as a substitute for multilateral efforts and the solution to this problem at the Conference on Disarmament. Setting up a working body of the Conference on this subject, where practical consideration of a nuclear test ban could be initiated, is not only overdue but long overdue. During the spring session of the Conference, through the efforts of many delegations, and above all those of the distinguished Ambassador of Japan, C. Yamada, we succeeded in laying a sound basis for reaching agreement. In our view the final solution to this issue should figure prominently on the work of the Conference at this summer session.

The Soviet Union views all initiatives aimed at ending nuclear tests with sympathy and support. We subscribe to the idea of extending the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty to underground tests as well; we are ready to implement our obligations as a depositary of the Treaty fully in convening the proposed conference to consider the amendments, and we will co-operate actively to that end both with the other depositaries and with the States which put forward the proposal or have supported it. In so doing, without ignoring fundamental differences in approaches by States to the problem of nuclear tests in general and amendments to the Treaty in particular, we intend to work for a constructive conference and urge all other interested parties to act likewise.

Another important means of limiting the modernization of nuclear weapons and curbing the quantitative and qualitative arms race could, we believe, be the termination of production of fissionable materials for nuclear warheads. As M.S. Gorbachev stated during his visit to Britain, the Soviet Union has decided to cease production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes this year. In addition to the shut-down of the industrial reactor for the production of weapons-grad plutonium in 1987, we plan to close two other such reactors this year and next year without commissioning new units to replace them. The above-mentioned measures undertaken by the Soviet Government are of course only a first step. The USSR supports the conclusion of a special international agreement on the cessation and eventual complete prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. Our call to conclude such an agreement is for understandable reasons addressed primarily to the United States Administration. It is also legitimate to raise the question of the non-use of nuclear warheads from the weapons systems which are to be eliminated in other weapons systems, which was touched upon in

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particular in the statement made on 13 June by the distinguished representative of Sweden, M.-B. Theorin. We believe that in the context of a verifiable agreement on cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, the elaboration of which we are proposing to the United States, the problem of the destruction of nuclear warheads which become available as a result of the dismantling of weapons could also be discussed.

Unfortunately, virtually every time that the issue of nuclear disarmament measure comes up, whether in the form of a test ban or the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, we hear references to the sacred cow of nuclear deterrence. The discussions at the Conference on Disarmament are no exception to this. We believe that if we are to speak of deterrence, we should speak not of deterrence by means of nuclear weapons but rather of deterrence of nuclear weapons themselves. This means abandoning the stockpiling and upgrading of such weapons, the steady and unswerving elimination of stocks until they have been completely eliminated, and prohibition of production. However, we are realists and we believe that given the very threatening nature of the concept of nuclear deterrence and its inconsistency with universal principles of morality, the movement towards renunciation of this concept should be gradual, taking into account the security interests of all States, including those that currently pin their defence on the nuclear factor. In this respect an important role is to be played by the establishment of truly defensive military structures in the States concerned, and confidence-building in the military field. The final result of this process should be the elaboration on the basis of a broad international consensus of a really feasible alternative to nuclear deterrence. True, the path to a nuclear-free world is strewn with many difficulties. Certain intermediate stages will be needed. Yet we believe in the real attainability of this goal, and we intend to pursue it not only through growing transparency and reliable verficiation, but also through confidence-building, which depends upon many aspects of present-day international life. However, the reduction and elimination of the nuclear threat is impossible unless a solution is found to the problem of preventing an arms race in space, which brings me to item 5 of the Conference's agenda.

As M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his recent message to the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Six-nation Initiative, space should remain free of arms. The Soviet-American dialogue in this field is important but, to quote the message, "more active use of multilateral diplomacy, and primarily the Conference on Disarmament", is also needed. The Soviet leader also confirmed in this context that the USSR "has not placed arms in space on a permanent basis and has no intention of being the first to do so". We have been and continue to be advocates of workable, far-reaching measures for the prevention of an arms race in space. They include, for instance, the prohibition of anti-satellite systems and space-to-Earth weapons, the creation of a system for the verification of the non-placement of arms in outer space, and in particular the establishment of an international space inspectorate, as well as a number of other proposals. We also believe that now it is important to try to find a common basis which would allow the Committee to move from general debate to the search for concrete arrangements. This might be a small first step to begin with, but it should and can be taken. Why should we not begin with measures to strengthen confidence and openness, which have proved

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themselves in some other field of arms limitation? As far as the Soviet delegation is concerned, it would not object to taking as a basis the idea proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany of "rules of the road" in space, including the elaboration of fly-by rules for manned and unmanned spacecraft, advance notification of the launch of space objects, inspections, the exchange of information, and so on. Also deserving of attention in this context is the French idea of space-based remote sensing systems for providing the international community with information, particularly in such areas as verification of arms limitation and the reduction of international tension. For our part, we too are working on specific considerations related to the issues of space monitoring.

Like the delegations of many other States, the Soviet delegation sincerely hopes that during the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament we will succeed in translating the results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons into real progress at the negotiations within the framework of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, making it possible to prepare a convention on the subject for signature at the earliest date. The efforts of the representative of France, Ambassador Morel, to attain that goal deserve the highest appreciation. We trust that with active and constructive participation by all member States of the Conference on Disarmament and observers in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons we shall be able shortly to reach agreement on a general system of verification of compliance with the future convention, resolve outstanding issues relating to the régime of authorized synthesis and production of schedule [1] chemicals, and move forward in resolving the issues of economic co-operation and development (article XI) and assistance in the event of the use of chemical weapons (article X). As for verification of compliance with the convention, in our view it should be based on a combination of systematic international verification and challenge inspections of any site or facility without the right of refusal. On this understanding we will not object to the proposal made by a number of States that no specific mention of the activities of national technical means of verification should be made in the convention.

A number of interesting considerations designed to improve the system of verification have recently been set out at the Conference on Disarmament. In particular, in April this year the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Oskar Fischer, advanced the idea of testing challenge inspection procedures. We are also studying with interest the working paper introduced by the delegation by the United Kingdom containing the first results of such trial inspections carried out in that country. For my part I wish to inform you that the USSR is also carrying out a national experiment related to challenge inspections, within the framework of which one visit to a military storage facility has already taken place. A summary of the results of this experiment will be presented at the negotiations.

Since the Soviet delegation intends to make a separate statement on the problems involved in the prohibition of chemical weapons, I shall refrain from a more detailed presentation of our views on this issue now, and limit myself to just one additional remark. Like all other delegations of member States of the Conference on Disarmament, we welcome the active interest in the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons on the part of a great number of countries, and note with satisfaction that the number of countries now

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

participating in the negotiations is no longer 40 but 64. This is a very positive development that paves the way to ensuring the universality of the future convention, which in turn is important both from a global point of view and from the standpoint of strengthening security and stability in various regions. In this connection the Soviet delegation attaches great significance to the provision of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference which states that any State wishing to contribute to the negotiations on chemical weapons should be able to do so. Let us be mindful of the agreement reached by all of us in Paris.

In conclusion, let me say a few words on a more personal note. First of all I would like to thank wholeheartedly all the distinguished representatives who have welcomed me as the new head of the USSR delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. Although I have participated in the work of the Conference since 1979, I am aware that I still have much to learn, and I am sincerely looking forward to good will and co-operation on the part of the distinguished representatives. I would like to assure you all that the Soviet delegation has been, is and will be open to business-like co-operation with the delegations of member States of the Conference as well as States participating in its work as observers. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey Ambassador Nazarkin's gratitude to all the representatives who wished him success in his new assignment. Finally, I join all those who have bid farewell to our outgoing colleagues - the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Campora, the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo the representative of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese. The Soviet delegation wishes them and their families bon voyage, good health and every success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the statement he has just made, and particularly for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now call on the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo.

Mr. RODRIGO (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, it is a very special privilege to address the CD under your eminent guidance. Your towering contribution to the cause of peace and disarmament is too well known to want description by me. Your work and your sense of dedication has been an inspiration to me since our very first association during the preparatory work of the non-aligned group in the period before the first SSOD. Our thanks are also due to Ambassador Bullut for his efficient stewardship of the Conference last month. It is my pleasure to see and welcome Under-Secretary-General Akashi with us this morning. I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Batsanov on his appointment as the head of the USSR delegation, and to wish him well. What was his maiden speech as Soviet representative is now followed by my farewell speech.

Virtually all speakers in the plenary have been commenting on the generally propitious climate now in evidence for the enhancement of international security and the promotion of disarmament measures. The two major nuclear-weapon States have, through careful internal and other decision-making processes, resolved to pursue their security and other interests through radically different and new approaches. In the last year alone, since the ratification of the INF agreement, we have seen further steps

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

towards negotiations on the reduction of the strategic offensive weapons of the two major nuclear Powers. In Vienna, negotiations on confidence-building measures and on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe have been advanced through new proposals, and political will has been developed to expedite their outcome. Unilateral disarmament initiatives and force reductions should find a corresponding response. In Geneva, bilateral nuclear and space talks have resumed this week.

All this has set in motion a de-escalation of tensions between the two nuclear Powers and the alliances in which they have placed their trust. Beyond disarmament, which is in a sense an aspect of international security, we also see several healthy tendencies, however tentative, tendencies whereby security is being considered not merely as a matter of regulating relations between States and their arsenals, but also as a matter necessitating the rational management, preservation and development of our single environment. Technology exchanges, communication linkages, economic interdependance and promotion of global markets, the development of new centres of economic power and the blurring of national boundaries have all combined to compel approaches to security which take into account not merely the national interest of a few States but also the need to accommodate the concerns of the totality of mankind. The pace of disarmament, which has its own unique dynamic and its own special momentum, will undoubtedly be helped on in the context of these wider global concepts and concerns.

The impact of these developments has certainly been appreciated in the CD, as many of the statements in plenary have indicated. Nevertheless, in most areas of work in the Conference, despite its accepted position as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, a corresponding will to negotiate has not been built up. In Sri Lanka's last statement, comment was made on the lack of tangible progress in respect of negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and on initiatives consequently being taken outside the Conference that might help to spur the CD's own efforts. Similarly we expressed the hope that following the Paris Conference of January this year, which underlined in universal political terms the urgency of the CD's tasks in respect of chemical weapons, the requisite political determination would be manifested to expedite a comprehensive and effective ban on these weapons. We have been kept briefed about the proposed Canberra conference. While we acknowledge the important need to "prepare" the chemical industry for the effective implementation of the convention being negotiated here in Geneva, the Canberra conference should not give credence to any possible partial or interim measures which could detract from the Geneva negotiations or lead to industry restraints on the transfer of technology.

While the universal consensus against chemical weapons has engendered a sense of urgency in the CD, regrettably the declared determination of all to prevent an arms race in outer space does not appear to be reflected in the record of the CD on this vital subject. In the CD, since 1985 the Ad hoc Committee concerned has dealt with the complexities of the subject and examined the existing legal régime - its positive elements as well as its limitations. The Committee has also had elucidated before it a number of proposals directed at different aspects of the overall question of preserving outer space for peaceful purposes and negotiating an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space. All this has brought to light a

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complex of legal, political, technical and other issues which need to be engaged in a serious manner. The working paper (CD/905) presented by Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, provides an admirable summary of the proposals and initiatives advanced by different member States underr item 5. The time has perhaps now come for a structured, more organized, negotiations-oriented approach to all the issues of outer space.

Document CD/905 is a convenient reminder also that there is clearly an intrinsic link between the three items on the Ad hoc Committee's work programme in the context of which the individual proposals can be given more detailed and organized examination. This would facilitate their clarification as well as the eventual negotiation of those proposals which have endured the weight of critical scrutiny and gained general acceptance. Unfortunately the Committee appears to be frittering away valuable time each successive year on sterile organizational debate on the hierachy and relative importance of the items on the work programme.

It is clear that despite differences of view among members, the major role played by the existing legal régime in outer space has been acknowledged. The future enhancement of this régime through wider participation and more complete compliance with existing treaties is a need universally acknowledged. The extent of its efficacy in preventing an arms race in outer space is of course an open question. The argument that it has held the peace thus far is hardly a guarantee for the future, given the bewildering pace of technological developments and the fact that what we call the space age is barely three decades old.

In Geneva, bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States have resumed this week on space issues, and any reluctance to be engaged in negotiations in a multilateral forum like the CD may perhaps be explained in terms of a lack of finality in negotiating positions. Nevertheless the commencement in parallel, in the CD, of negotiations on space issues will not deny the special responsibility of those with major space capabilities nor in any way hinder or circumscribe their efforts towards commonly held goals.

There could be two basic approaches to negotiations on outer space in the CD. The first could focus on disarmament and arms control, and would involve working towards a comprehensive ban or limitations on weapons of all types. This would also involve the consideration of proposals for the amendment of the 1967 outer space Treaty. This approach would furthermore need to work towards guaranteeing immunity for satellites and the banning or severe restriction of ASAT weapons. The second alternative approach would concentrate for the time being on confidence-building measures, and here there is an abundance of material on which to work profitably and productively. This includes the French proposal on an international satellite monitoring agency, the Soviet proposal on an international space inspectorate, the proposals made by the Federal Republic of Germany on "rules of the road", and proposals advanced by a number of delegations, including my own, which centre on the strengthening of the registration Convention and measures for greater transparency in outer space activities.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna have all shown the advantages of the second sort of approach in ultimately helping the first sort. Neither Helsinki nor Stockholm focused on disarmament per se, but they nevertheless provided a helpful climate which eased the way for disarmament and arms control in the European context. The suggestion that consideration should be given to a protocol to the registration Convention deserves particular consideration. This could be a concrete first step, modest though it may seem, towards the realization of one of the goals of the 1967 outer space Treaty by building international confidence in space activities through greater openness.

With respect to outer space, preventing an arms race is decidedly better than curing or curbing one. The choice could still be exercised between, on the one hand, pursuing its potential for peaceful development, and, on the other, courting conflicts of a nature and scale that could hardly be assessed at this early stage of man's entry into space.

The spreading launch capability of militarily significant States is being justified on both civilian and defence grounds. Space applications and the conversion of currently Earth-bound or modest technological capabilities are no longer a remote possibility. If the current space Powers do not support a multilateral process for preventing the weaponization of space, the entire existing space system, which is said to provide strategic stability, could, with the inevitable proliferation of military space tecnology, become a soft strategic target. Experience shows that sectoral controls without a comprehensive and multilateral approach, as for example in the nuclear and chemical field, cannot ensure globally effective non-proliferation.

Quite apart from likely future applications in space, the refining of launch capabilities could hardly be expected to promote confidence in regions which have thus far been spared the dubious advantage of such weaponry. If the potential for more sophisticated space application appears remote at this point of time, then at least the regional ramifications of such capabilities deserve consideration.

This is my last intervention in the CD as the representative of Sri Lanka. Some farewell statements have tended to pronounce judgements on the CD, its methods of work or methods of inactivity, and to make prescriptions for greater effectiveness. With barely two years in the CD I hardly feel qualified to engage in such an exercise.

For a small country like Sri Lanka, membership in the CD has been more than a nominal privilege. Being a militarily insignificant State with a small delegation at the Conference table has not, however, made us feel any less inadequate in a forum which includes among its membership virtually all the major military Powers - global as well as regional. Indeed, Sri Lanka has felt it a special honour to represent as we do not merely ourselves but, in a sense, also the vast majority of non-aligned States whose security and strength is based not on weapons, and whose reliance and trust in the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and non-alignment constitute an important line of defence in protecting our independence and sovereignity.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

All States big and small are equal in the face of the omnipresent threat of nuclear weapons. This threat also unites us all. The CD is a representative organ, and its credibility would be enhanced to the extent that it is able to take account of the concerns of all States, including the small States. This is particularly critical at a time of great power shifts and tectonic movements which could lock small States into situations not of their choosing, or even crush them.

The CD's basic agenda has remained the same since the late 1970s. The emphasis, as it rightly should be, has been on global disarmament issues. In Vienna, a new focus has been concentrated on conventional weapons in a particular regional context, in this case that of Europe. Admittedly, Europe is a special case. Twice in a mere half-century the cancer of war has spread world-wide from conflicts emanating from this single region. The legacy of the last war is indeed still being unravelled.

To concentrate such a focus in a regional framework on conventional weapons has not in any way downgraded the overriding priority of dealing with th nuclear threat. Speakers before me have commented on the settlement or near-settlement in terms of the current healthier relationship between the super-Powers, of issues described as "regional" and in which it has been conventional weapons that have had their play. I would not of course agree with some speakers that the persistence of some such regional problems obstructs the future improvement of relations between the major Powers. The situation is far more complex, and generalizations mask the true position. Many though not all of the regional issues that have been discussed were in fact complicated and exacerbated, if not indeed caused, by some super-Power action. The solution of these issues, by the same token, has been facilitated by the development of more enlightened attitudes on the part of the super-Powers, based on principles advocated by the United Nations and by the non-aligned group.

In different circumstances other regional situations could also become centres of conflict, not necessarily in consequence of extra-regional factors. Suggestions that regional aspects of disarmament and conventional disarmament require some formalized framework for consideration in the CD deserve careful attention. The issues involved do not lend themselves to easy analysis.

In my first intervention before the CD in August 1987, I stated that I was beginning work where my predecessor left off. From where I leave off now, my successor will continue reiterating the consistent commitment of Sri Lanka to the important work of the CD as the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament. For me personally the last two years in the CD have been a richly rewarding experience, and I am grateful for the insights they have afforded me on a multitude of issues concerning disarmament and international security. Let me in conclusion thank you all for your friendship and wish the CD all success in its vital task.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for the kind words he addressed to the Chair at the beginning of his statement. I am sure that I speak on behalf of all the members of the Conference when I thank him for his activities here during the

(The President)

two years when he was part of the Conference. We learned with special pleasure that his Government holds a well-deserved opinion of his participation in the Conference on Disarmament, and that in his country's Foreign Ministry he is to head the United Nations bureau, while remaining closely connected with disarmament as a member of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. He may be sure that in that task the best wishes of all his former colleagues in the Conference go with him.

I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? It seems not. Consequently, I should like to turn to the request from Qatar to participate in our work in the plenary and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 7 and 8 of the agenda. The note from Qatar was circulated on 8 June, and no comments have been received from the members. That being the case, we may take a decision on the request without holding an informal meeting, on the understanding that this sets no precedent for the future.

I put before the Conference the draft decision contained in document CD/WP.366, concerning the request received from Qatar. If there is no objection, I shall consider it adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now turn to the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared after consultations with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 27 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.512
27 June 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 27 June 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)

GE.89-61549/0713B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 512th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

First of all I should like to welcome to the Conference the members of the Arms Control Observer Group of the United States Senate, who are here to follow the work of this plenary meeting. I thank them for their interest in our activities, and hope that their time with us will be useful to them in fulfilling their important functions.

I would like to inform the Conference that by a note from its Permanent Representative in New York addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the name of the State formerly called the Union of Burma has been changed to the Union of Myanmar. The Permanent Representative also requested the placing of the new name of the State under M in alphabetical order as a result of the change. Accordingly, the secretariat has effected the change requested for this plenary meeting, and will also do so in the subsidiary bodies.

Today the Conference continues its consideration of items 1 and 2 on its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Conference. On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Bulgaria. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, the United States delegation joins those who have already taken the floor this month in congratulating you on your assumption of the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament for a second time. Your achievements in the field of disarmament, including the Nobel Prize for Peace, are well known to us all, and need no elaboration. We pledge you our continuing co-operation. Our delegation would also like to welcome the new representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Serguei Batsanov. To him, and to our departing colleagues, Ambassadors Nazarkin of the Soviet Union, Cámpora of Argentina, Pugliese of Italy, and Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, we extend our best wishes for success.

As you mentioned, Mr. President, we are pleased and highly honoured to note that with our delegation today are members of the United States Senate Arms Control Observer Group and their staff, who are visiting Geneva for consultations on the nuclear and space talks, the nuclear testing talks, and the chemical weapons negotiations. Our delegation welcomes Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who represents the State of Rhode Island, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, Senator Jake Garn of Utah, Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland and Senator John Warner of the State of Virginia. Their presence here testifies to the strong interest in the legislative branch of the United States Government in our negotiations on a chemical weapons ban.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Today I would like to present the views of the United States on some of the current issues in the chemical weapons negotiations. At the outset I want to stress the personal commitment of the President of the United States, George Bush, to chemical weapons arms control. Our delegation knows that this commitment is shared by our colleagues here in the Conference, and particularly by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, and the chairmen of the five working groups serving under Ambassador Morel. They have all amply demonstrated their ability and commitment, and there is no lack of dedication in the Conference.

We are also encouraged by the fact that most of the countries that need to be parties to the convention to make it effective are already participating in the negotiations. The future convention must be a truly global one. For that reason the United States attaches great importance to the principle that was expressed in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference last January, namely, "any State wishing to contribute to these negotiations should be able to do so". All of us supported this principle in Paris; let us all support it in Geneva.

The negotiations, however, show us that commitment is only part of the solution to the problem of chemical weapons. Hard work on the details of a multitude of complex issues is necessary as well, particularly in the area of verification. With that in mind, let me address specific verfication-related issues in the negotiations. Working Group 1 on verification is dealing now with a number of issues that are vitally important to an effective ban. Our insistence upon verifiability of arms control agreements is broader than just the agreement being negotiated here in the CD. It is indeed an insistence that is well known in all arms control areas. As arms control negotiations aim for substantial cuts in existing arsenals, and as arms control agreements increase in complexity, detailed and effective verification provisions become even more critical. We welcome the growing recognition by the international community of this very important fact. The building of confidence, however, must begin well before an agreement enters into force. We need confidence that the information to be provided under a particular agreement will be accurate and that the verification procedures will be sound. For these reasons, we strongly support advance data exchange, with provisions for its verification, and trial inspections as an essential component of the process of negotiating a chemical weapons ban.

Our striving for effective verification is not, as it is sometimes described, an effort to achieve perfection. Rather, it is an effort to ensure that the future chemical weapons convention protects our security. We will not lower our standards for security simply to meet an artificial deadline or to experience the exhilaration of a treaty-signing ceremony. As we have said before, having an agreement without effective verification would be worse than having no agreement at all.

One critical task in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban involves verification in the chemical industry. We welcome the informal consultations being held this week between negotiators and chemical industry representatives from many countries. We welcome as well the convening of the conference in

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Australia in September. It can provide an opportunity for serious discussion between government and industry, not only on the negotiations but also on other aspects of chemical weapons arms control, such as the growing problems of the movements of chemical weapons precursors and technology in international commerce. From the beginning of the negotiations, the United States Government and the United States chemical industry have recognized the importance of providing assurance that the civil chemical industry is not being misused for illegal chemical weapons production activities. Since 1977, government and industry have been working together to develop provisions for a future chemical weapons convention that will provide effective verification and at the same time protect legitimate sensitive and confidential business information.

The United States welcomed the suggestion in 1988 that States participating in the negotiations conduct trial inspections in the civil chemical industry to assist the negotiating process. In February 1989, United States experts conducted a national trial inspection at the facility operated by Akzo Chemicals in West Virginia. This facility produces schedule [2] chemicals from a schedule [3] chemical. The schedule [2] chemicals are legitimate commercial products that are used as flame retardants and for other purposes. I have already provided preliminary comments on this trial inspection in my plenary statement on 4 April. Today the report on this first trial inspection is being distributed as document CD/922. This report describes in detail the activities that were carried out, and it outlines our findings.

One of the most important findings is that further work is necessary in specific areas identified in the report. The United States views this first national trial inspection as the beginning of a process to develop and refine inspection procedures, not as a test of procedures that are close to final form. This first trial inspection omitted testing some necessary procedures, such as notification, transportation, and escort arrangements. Other gaps have also been recognized, and procedures need to be improved. Thus, it is clear to us that further work on a national level, especially additional trial inspections, will be necessary to establish a realistic data base. This emphasis on further work at the national level does not mean that we oppose discussion of possible approaches to multilateral follow-on efforts. We will seek to ensure, however, that multilateral activities contribute to the negotiation of effective verification provisions. In our view activities should be organized to facilitate broad acceptance of the results. Thus, the activities should be based on multilaterally agreed objectives, they should provide realistic tests, and they should involve all interested delegations in the preparation and conduct of the activities.

In the absence of realistic and valid multilaterally agreed inspection procedures, and adequate protection for confidential business information, we question the value of multilateral equivalents of the national trial inspections. We need well grounded, business-like experiments, and not media events. We are concerned that such efforts either will be superficial, and therefore a poor model for inspections under the convention, or that they will be inadequate to protect confidential information. We also are sceptical that

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such inspections could add much to what has already been learned from national inspections. Instead of focusing attention on multilateral inspections, it would be better to undertake several types of multilateral activities related to chemical industry verification. Collectively, these might be termed a multilateral verification experiment. This could include such activities as visits to chemical plants and on-site demonstrations of inspection procedures. Work by multilateral expert teams to solve problems discovered in national trial inspections, such as the need for on-site instrumentation and the question of how to handle verification data that is acquired on industry activities, are other important matters deserving attention.

Before leaving the subject of trial inspections, I would like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Hyltenius and the Swedish delegation. They have been instrumental in the success of the initial trial inspection activities. We hope that the Conference will be able to draw on their political skill and technical expertise in future work in this area.

With regard to monitoring the chemical industry, the Conference has sought to find a way to extend the verification system of the draft convention to chemical production facilities that are not covered by the existing data reporting and inspection régimes, but that could be used for chemical weapons production. These are the so-called "CW-capable" facilities. For this reason, some had advocated that a new list, which was initially called "Schedule [4]", be established with a monitoring régime very similar to the already agreed régime for key precursors under schedule [2]. The United States position, based on the 1984 United States draft convention, has been that any toxic commercial chemical that poses a substantial risk should be placed under the same monitoring régime as key precursors, and that a separate, new schedule is not necessary. In addition, we have expressed concern about "CW-capable" facilities.

Positions have been evolving as a result of the detailed technical discussions of the schedule [4] concept. The flaws in a separate schedule [4] are now broadly recognized and delegations are groping for an alternative. During the spring part of the 1989 session, a proposal to subdivide schedule [2] to create a "schedule [2B]" for toxic chemicals attracted considerable interest. In addition, the United Kingdom has suggested that its concept of "ad hoc inspections" could assist in dealing with the "CW-capable" facilities themselves. Most delegations, however, have not formally committed themselves on these ideas. Nor has a clear picture emerged of what specific chemicals should be placed on a list.

After carefully reviewing the different approaches, the United States believes that both a schedule [2B] and ad hoc verification provisions are necessary. We propose that the insecticide "Amiton" be placed on schedule [2B]. This insecticide, which is no longer produced, is chemically related to the nerve agent VX and is extremely toxic. Existing toxicity information is sparse, but it suggests that this chemical falls in the super-toxic lethal range. We are not persuaded that any of the other toxic chemicals suggested for the list are appropriate.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

The United States welcomes the very constructive proposal by the United Kingdom for "ad hoc inspections", as outlined in document CD/909. This proposal, and the significant proposal for "ad hoc checks" presented by the Federal Republic of Germany in document CD/869, have opened up important possibilities for strengthening the verification of non-production. While the two approaches are somewhat different, both have strong points that could be incorporated in an eventual provision for ad hoc verification. We hope that such a provision can be developed relatively soon.

Let me turn now to the question of challenge inspection. From the beginning of the negotiations, challenge inspection has been recognized as one of the key issues. The United States proposal in April 1984 for mandatory, short-notice challenge inspections represented a turning-point in the negotiations. Another turning-point was reached three years later in August 1987, when Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced to the Conference that his country also supported challenge inspection without the right of refusal. For almost two years now, the United States and the Soviet Union have had a common approach to challenge inspection. Yet during that time there has been no concerted effort to complete this key provision. Delegations which have serious concerns have remained largely silent. This has left a gaping hole in the most important area of any convention, the verification régime.

We are heartened, however, by the positive developments. The initiation of trial inspections represents a major contribution to the negotiations. In this connection, we welcome the ambitious efforts by the United Kingdom as reported in document CD/921, as well as the announcement that the Soviet Union has carried out a trial challenge inspection. It is our hope that these efforts will help to resolve concerns about the intrusiveness of challenge inspections. Furthermore, we are encouraged by the plans to hold consultations on challenge inspection this summer. We urge delegations to participate actively and to make their views clear. In this connection I want to emphasize that ad hoc verification and challenge inspection are complementary. Both are normal and necessary types of verification and each has a separate and distinct role to play. Nether can take the place of the other. Both types of verification should be discussed in parallel in the Conference.

With regard to the question of protection of confidential information, in our view, a convention must contain detailed safeguards for sensitive information. This topic was discussed at length during the spring and is expected to receive attention during the summer as well. As a result of the spring discussions there now appears to be general recognition that the need to protect information applies not only to commercial secrets, but also to sensitive military information, such as security arrangements for CW storage sites and technical information on CW production facilities. We believe that a special annex on confidentiality is warranted. The Chairman's working paper resulting from discussions in the spring provides an excellent basis for further work. A certain amount of refinement and strengthening is necessary, however. It is important that the planned annex provide a clear and simple framework for the detailed regulations of the Technical Secretariat that will

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be needed. We have a number of specific suggestions that will be provided to the Chairman of Working Group 1. It is our hope and expectation that a revised text for the annex can be incorporated in the "rolling text" in August.

While the annex on confidentiality is already well along, work is just beginning on the proposed protocol containing detailed inspection provisions. We welcome this new undertaking, which builds on earlier accomplishments under Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic and Mr. Numata of Japan. Developing the inspection protocol will be a complex undertaking that will require great care. It is critical to an effective verification system. Thus, it should not be drafted hastily to meet some artificial deadline. The United States has carefully considered these matters and plans to participate actively and constructively in development of the protocol.

Finally, I would like to comment on activities in Working Group 4 that relate to verification. I have in mind the development of the so-called "chemical annex". We applaud this effort by Mr. Molander to consolidate technical provisions related to the lists of chemicals subject to restriction or monitoring. The chemical annex makes the structure of the convention more logical and comprehensible.

I wanted to focus today on verification-related issues because of their critical importance to an effective ban. There are, of course, other important issues which I was unable to address today because of time limitations. However, I plan to present additional United States views in some of these areas later in the session.

Before I conclude, I would like to apologize to the other speakers because our delegation will have to absent itself at this time for briefings with our Senate arms control delegation, and I would like to sincerely apologize to the other three speakers.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on today's list is Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany. I have pleasure in giving him the floor.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): As I am taking the floor for the first time under your stewardship, Mr. President, I first wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for the month of June. I am very happy from a professional and from a personal point of view to see you in the Chair, presiding over the debates of our Conference. I also wish to express my gratitude to our previous President, Ambassador Bullut of Kenya. Let me also take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Batsanov on his appointment as the new representative and head of delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference on Disarmament. I have come to know and appreciate him over the past years for his eminent expertise in our work, his human and his outstanding personal qualities. I am looking forward to continue working closely with him. It is with regret that I note the departure of Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy,

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Nazarkin of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I have very much enjoyed their close co-operation and the friendship they have extended to me.

The traumatic experience with chemical weapons during the First World War made the international community aware of the barbarity of these weapons and led to the conclusion of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We are now in a somewhat similar situation: the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq and against the Kurdish civilian population has alarmed the international community. Is the recent actual use of chemical weapons only an indication that the taboo on chemical weapons is disappearing? The alleged rapid spread of these weapons seems to confirm this notion. Chemical weapons are now said to be in the arsenals of more than 20 countries. This situation which must cause serious concern, calls for determined action. And we have to act expeditiously. We are called upon to stem the tide and prevent chemical weapons from becoming an accepted means of warfare. The Paris Conference united high-level representatives from 149 countries in the common endeavour to put an end to the use and spread of chemical weapons. To this end, all participants in the Paris Conference stressed in the Final Declaration the urgency of concluding, at the earliest date, a convention banning chemical weapons.

The Geneva Protocol has proved - as we have become painfully aware - inadequate to prevent the use of chemical weapons. It still allows the development, acquisition and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Another major drawback is that the Geneva Protocol does not provide for any verification measures. Clearly the best way to stop the proliferation of chemical weapons and to free mankind once and for all from the scourge of chemical weapons is the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities are eliminated and that any further manufacture, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited and that this is subject to effective verification. Unless such a comprehensive solution is obtained, the risk of use of chemical weapons will persist.

Interim measures designed to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons are far less effective than a comprehensive chemical weapons convention and I will say why. A comprehensive ban is the only means of establishing an internationally and globally accepted norm that makes the possession of chemical weapons illegal. A régime providing only for non-proliferation measures would be considered by many to be discriminatory. There may not be sufficient incentive to renounce the option of acquiring chemical weapons as long as arsenals of chemical weapons continue to exist. Interim measures, moreover, cannot reliably rule out any misuse of chemicals and equipment which have been supplied for peaceful purposes. And there will be no means of verification to deter such misuse and dispel suspicion of clandestine production of chemical weapons. If we perceive the fight against chemical weapons as consisting only of measures to prevent their proliferation, we are ignoring the real scope of the issue. We could thereby undermine the commitment of the international community to erase chemical weapons from the face of the Earth by way of a global and comprehensive convention.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

My plea today for a comprehensive global convention banning chemical weapons is prompted by my Government's concern not to miss a historic opportunity. The Paris Conference called for a redoubling of our efforts at the negotiating table here in Geneva. Despite the tight schedule of our meetings and the increased pace of our negotiations, I cannot but observe that we have so far failed to turn the impetus given by the Paris Conference into the urgently needed progress on the crucial issues of our negotiations.

Let me try to illustrate this point. The verification of compliance with the provisions of the convention we are endeavouring to achieve is one of the crucial aspects of our negotiations. From the outset we knew that it would be one of the most difficult issues to resolve. We welcomed the progress which has been achieved on this problem over the last few years. We now have a verification system, the elements of which have already been largely developed. Yet I get the impression that some delegations are still hesitant to commit themselves. Challenge inspections must - and all delegations seem to agree on that - be considered a corner-stone of the whole verification system, as they constitute an all-embracing measure enabling all States parties to clarify doubts about compliance. The concept of this measure has been under discussion for several years. Yet views still seem to diverge on the specific modalities of this measure. However, these differences are, in my opinion, by no means insurmountable. Rather, I am under the impression that their significance is sometimes overestimated. It should be possible to achieve concrete results which would be reflected in the "rolling text" by the end of this session. A text on challenge inspections in appendix I completing the existing draft of article IX would be a manifestation of our common resolve. Such a result would also provide the necessary basis to complete the verification system. It would be understood as a long-needed signal which could also stimulate work on other parts of the convention.

The numerous national trial inspections which have been conducted over the past few months bear witness to the fact that we are on the right track. The report on the British trial challenge inspections confirms this notion. It should provide a very useful input on the further discussions, in particular on inspection procedures. A review of the reports on national trial inspections in chemical industry facilities demonstrates that article VI and its annexes provide a sound basis for the verification of non-production. The valuable experience gained in these trials should have a reassuring effect and enable us to put the finishing touches to the verification régimes of article VI.

The extensive discussions on the need for additional verification measures in the convention have as yet not been conclusive. At the beginning of last year it was my delegation which put forward a proposal for ad hoc checks that are intended to supplement the existing routine measures for the verification of non-production. We proposed this concept in an attempt to meet concerns expressed about the ease with which chemical weapons can be produced clandestinely in the chemical industry. Ad hoc checks are a flexible, easily manageable and unintrusive means of verification which can cover all facilities in the chemical industry capable of producing chemical weapons and deter any production of chemical weapons in them.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

Only last week we concluded a trial ad hoc check at a chemical plant in the Federal Republic of Germany. The results, on which a report will be submitted to the Conference soon, are encouraging, and corroborate our view that ad hoc checks are effective and feasible. We have presented our proposal as an input to an ongoing debate, as I explained in my statement on 13 September last year, in which I introduced our second working paper (CD/869) on ad hoc checks. It has been our intention to stimulate further thinking. We are open to any other suggestion or compromise which meets the requirement of a solution that is manageable and at the same time effective.

Let me stress again that we consider the existing verification system sound and reliable. Any ad hoc verification measure we may add to it should be regarded only as filling out the existing draft provisions. It should not in any way fundamentally change or detract from the established verification framework. The convention we are envisaging poses particularly difficult verification problems. But we should keep in mind that no disarmament agreement will be 100 per cent verifiable. Yet we believe that the verification system of the convention will be effective in deterring possible violations of the convention.

And at a more general level, all States would in terms of security be better off with a comprehensive and global convention than without it, even if the convention did not contain verification measures which could come up to the ideal of 100 per cent detectability. This should be especially clear in view of the current situation, which is characterized by speculation and suspicion about the threat posed by existing or allegedly existing CW stockpiles and the proliferation of chemical weapons. A convention would provide confidence: existing CW stockpiles and production facilities would be eliminated, and this process would be subject to strict verification; the production, processing and consumption of the chemicals in question would be monitored, thus giving assurance that such substances are not diverted for chemical weapons purposes; even if doubts about compliance were to persist, States parties could resort to the instrument of challenge inspections, which would permit swift clarification in any case involving serious concerns about security. Had the international community been able to resort to such an instrument in the past, many ambiguous situations - also pertaining to the alleged proliferation of chemical weapons - could have been resolved or, more likely still, avoided in the first place.

The Paris Conference gave expression to the world-wide consensus for a global ban on chemical weapons. Let us not lose this consensus. The conclusion of our negotiations is overdue. It is not possible to maintain the momentum in the negotiations indefinitely. We here in Geneva should not succumb to the danger of getting bogged down in protracted discussions of unnecessary details. It is our responsiblity to seek early breakthroughs on the crucial issues which remain to be resolved and stand in the way of final agreement. Let us make use of the "window of opportunity" provided by the historic situation we find ourselves in. Let us also remember this: time is not on our side. The risk of further proliferation, and of chemical weapons becoming an accepted means of warfare, is growing. Thus, there is no time to lose.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for me to take the floor under your esteemed chairmanship. The Conference is fortunate that for the second time it can reap the fruits of your wisdom and experience as a President. I wish to thank Ambassador Bullut of Kenya for his efforts as President for the month of April. Like others, I wish to welcome the new representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Serguei Batsanov, already well known to us from previous years. I also wish to welcome an old friend, the new representative of Algeria, Ambassador Ait-Chaalal. I wish to thank our departing colleagues, Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy and Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka for their co-operation, and I wish them success in their new endeavours.

Today I shall only introduce some working documents. Later in this session I hope to give a somewhat more elaborate presentation on a number of issues. Let me start by introducing a document on behalf of those countries of the CD that are members of the North Atlantic Alliance, which I believe will be available at the end of this morning. It is CD/926, to which are attached two documents in the original French and English, a "Declaration of the heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels (29-30 May 1989)", and a report entitled "A comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament" as adopted on the same occasion by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. These important documents together reflect the views of the North Atlantic Alliance on progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. They point the way to achieving increased security at substantially lower levels of armaments. As such they are highly relevant for our work in the CD. The "comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament" reiterates the Western commitment to a total ban on chemical weapons. The documents also make clear the Western position on nuclear weapons and conventional armaments. On this basis heads of State and Government have demonstrated both what can be achieved and the limits of what is feasible. I recommend these documents to your close scrutiny.

On behalf of the Netherlands delegation I would like to introduce working papers CD/924 and CD/925 on two trial inspections recently held in the Netherlands both in the same plant. I wish to recall that in 1986 the Netherlands organized one of the first trial inspections, which was followed by a workshop for all participants in the chemical weapons negotiations. The value of testing out inspection procedures has now been widely accepted, and a surprisingly large number of national trial inspections has been held since last year's summer session. Ambassador Ekéus and later Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden have played a pivotal role in preparing these trial inspections and guiding their follow-up, and I wish to thank them for it. It has, up to now, been a very successful exercise.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Our efforts should, indeed, be called inspection exercises, as we have not taken all necessary steps required for a real international inspection. The United States delegate, Ambassador Friedersdorf, made a similar remark this morning. We conducted two exercises in order to highlight some problems which we encountered in the negotiations recently. These problems are related in particular to the objectives of an inspection. For example: Is this inspection required because we are afraid that a declared schedule [2] compound is being misused? Or is it required primarily because the production equipment of the declared plant is suitable for the production of schedule [1] chemicals? In short: is the inspection concerned with the chemicals or with the equipment?

In fact, in our view, it concerns both. In article VI of the present "rolling text" more attention has been given, however, to misuse of particular chemicals and not so much to that of equipment: a plant that produces non-toxic schedule [2] chemicals will be brought under routine inspections, even when it is clearly incapable of producing super-toxic chemicals. On the other hand, under the currently envisaged régime, a plant that is perfectly suited for large-scale production of super-toxic chemicals will not have to be declared and routinely inspected as long as it does not produce or process one of the scheduled chemicals.

I would like to suggest that different objectives call for different approaches. In the Dutch verification exercises we have therefore pursued two different tracks. In one exercise we monitored the batch processing of a schedule [2] chemical in one reactor of a very versatile multi-purpose plant. Before the inspection took place, a facility attachment was negotiated with the plant management. In the second exercise we verified the non-production of chemical warfare agents in the whole chemical complex, consisting in fact of more than 100 reactor vessels. This inspection had an ad hoc character, i.e. it was not based on an agreed facility attachment. Both exercises were carried out satisfactorily, but they also gave us quite some food for thought, as will be clear from the working papers.

For example, a question that may seem purely technical at first sight, but which in fact is crucial for the relevance of routine inspection under annex [2] of article VI, is the definition of "facility". Do we mean one reactor with associated equipment? Do we mean all reactors within one building? Or do we mean the whole chemical complex?

The reports on trial inspections conducted so far show that all three interpretations have been used. The implication is that the scope of those trial inspections that have used the broadest interpretation might be 100 times or even 1,000 times as wide as when the most restrictive interpretation has been used. The relevance and feasibility of routine inspection is therefore highly dependent on a clear definition of "facility".

During the ad hoc exercise in the whole chemical complex we studied some specific characteristics of a plant that is capable of producing chemical warfare agents. A list of some possible characteristics is included in CD/925. We hope that our suggestions will be discussed in the relevant

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

working groups, together with important proposals made by others, including the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, and that they will contribute to solving the difficult problem of the CW capability of the chemical industry.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik, for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the last speaker on the list for today, Mr. Bojilov, the representative of Bulgaria.

Mr. BOJILOV (Bulgaria): Several delegations have taken the floor before me since we resumed our session. Though they may have differed on a number of issues, there was one point of full convergence in all statements, everybody's profound respect for you, Mr. President. My delegation cannot but join in this consensus, one of the few that we have witnessed lately. It would be difficult to add a lot to what has already been said about your human and professional qualities. Let me simply state how pleased and honoured I am to address this forum at a time when you are presiding over its proceedings. I would also like to join those speakers who expressed appreciation to the distinguished Ambassadors Mario Cámpora of Argentina, Aldo Pugliese of Italy and Rodrigo of Sri Lanka for their outstanding contributions to the work of the Conference. I wish them every success in their new responsible assignments.

It is a truism that the Conference on Disarmament does not work in a political vacuum. This is the basic reason why, at the beginning of every session, we always take a look at the major events in the world, especially those which could directly or indirectly, have an impact on our work. It was not so long ago that events used to be the cause of gloomy thoughts and pessimistic forecasts. Lately, it is optimism that prevails in the analysis and assessment of trends in international life. The course towards improvement of East-West relations and the gradual consolidation of mutual trust materialize in large-scale practical measures in fields where that seemed unthinkable until recently. The new Soviet-American agreement on the prevention of dangerous military activities, signed recently in Moscow, is new proof that there are no problems that cannot be solved in the presence of good will.

In the light of the May visit by Secretary of State James Baker to Moscow, we are tempted to believe that a period of new vigour in the dialogue between the two countries is under way and that the necessary psychological background exists for meaningful progress in the following areas: the Soviet American negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons; the negotiations which are to ensure the strict observance and strengthening of the régime of the ABM Treaty; and the negotiations on the step-by-step suspension of nuclear weapon tests, with the expected first step of ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties.

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

Decisive headway is possible and indispensable on the multilateral front as well. The proposals for a sharp reduction in armed forces and armaments in Europe announced recently by Mikhail Gorbachev, and the constructive approach contained in George Bush's proposals on this subject, fill us with hopes for the success of the Vienna negotiations. Initial analysis of the WTO and NATO proposals in the conventional field show a good degree of convergence on a number of points: the readiness to set up equal collective ceilings on armed forces and armaments - considerably lower than the existing ones in both alliances; recognition of the need to eliminate above all those categories of armaments which have the potential for a surprise attack and large-scale operations; the understanding that the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals could be divided into regions, and that for every region equal collective ceilings could be established; agreement on the desirability of determining the maximum size of conventional armed forces and armaments that one country can possess in the alliance framework, and the size of the armed forces which can be deployed outside the national territory; and determination to carry out continuous and effective verification of the implementation of the reductions.

At the same time, the differences that have to be reconciled in the course of the negotiations should not be underestimated. It is very important not to undertake measures that are likely to complicate the negotiating process in Vienna. It should not be forgotten that the problem of tactical nuclear weapons also requires negotiations. The appeal from the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the member States of NATO, contained in document CD/918 submitted by the delegation of Romania, states that "the disarmament process, which ensures confidence-building, must cover the entire complex of the armed forces, infantry, air force and navy, and all armaments - conventional, nuclear and chemical - ready to be used in a European contingency".

It is generally recognized that bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts should not be mutually exclusive. Moreover, it is desirable that they should, as much as possible, be complementary options. In this vein, I would like to draw the attention of the Conference to the declaration signed on 23 April this year by the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Greece, Andreas Papandreou and distributed in the Conference as document CD/919. In our submission the declaration is consonant with the positive trends in international life. The leaders of the two States, which belong to different politico-military alliances, state the intention of their respective Governments to "elaborate norms of behaviour with a view to turning their territories into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons". It should also be noted that the two leaders state that they are encouraged by the favourable prospects for concluding a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, and are determined to sign it immediately upon its opening for signature. The declaration as a whole is based on a wish to contribute by concrete actions to promoting multilateral Balkan co-operation and working out confidence-building and security-building measures in the region.

Speaking about expectations and hopes, it is natural that we ask ourselves what role the Conference on Disarmament can and should play in the new political environment that is taking shape [illegible]

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

If we did not admit that the Conference still has difficulties in joining the general stream of events in the world and - at least to some extent - remains unaffected by the positive trends in international life. There is definitely a change - in the tone and in the general atmosphere. We welcome that. But international public opinion is expecting results, at least one multilateral convention as soon as possible.

It could be said, without exaggeration, that at present the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body, is staked mainly if not exclusively on one card - the elaboration of a draft convention on a comprehensive and total chemical weapon ban. In January of this year 149 countries gathered in Paris were unanimous in acknowledging "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction". The Paris Conference called upon the Conference on Disarmament "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date".

My delegation highly appreciates the efforts deployed so far by Ambassador Morel in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, as well as the energy and dedication of the five chairmen of the working groups. There is no doubt that the work has been intensified. We have a new structure for the negotiations, more meetings, more discussions, more participants in the negotiations. A great amount of technical work has been done, and some results have been achieved. Most unfortunately, however, we have been unable, during the spring session, to come closer to the solution of a few critically important outstanding issues which are generally recognized to be the crux of the future draft convention. In our view it is imperative at this stage for the Ad hoc Committee, and in particular its working groups, to avoid a repetition of past discussion. It is also imperative for them not to be obsessed with issues of detail which have - at least to some extent - acquired disproportionate importance during the spring session. It is high time for the negotiations to give priority to efforts aimed at finalizing the provisions on challenge inspections, agreeing on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities, and reaching understanding on the composition and decision-making powers of the Executive Council. Given political will on the part of all participants in the negotiations, it should be possible to reach agreement on a general scheme of verification of compliance with the convention and to resolve the outstanding issues related to the régime of synthesis and production of schedule [1] chemicals not prohibited by the convention. It is also time to move forward in finding solutions to the problems involved in article X and article XI.

My delegation welcomes the resumption of the Soviet-American consultations on chemical weapons. We expect them to produce results which give a strong impetus to the negotiations in the framework of the Conference. My delegation hopes that during the summer session the Conference will succeed in translating the spirit and letter of the Declaration of the Paris Conference into real progress in the elaboration of the draft convention.

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

The Bulgarian delegation shares the view that item 1 of our agenda remains a litmus test for the Conference in the field of nuclear disarmament. The time is long overdue for us to proceed with concrete and substantive work on a nuclear test ban. It seems that we are closer than ever to making a move, however modest it may be, on item 1 of our agenda. We highly appreciate the efforts of Ambassador Yamada of Japan aimed at reaching a consensus on the mandate for an ad hoc committee. From the statements that we have heard last spring and now, we have the impression that the majority of delegations are ready and willing to work on the basis of the proposal contained in document CD/863, which provides for the possibility of carrying out useful work on a number of important aspects of a future CTBT.

During the spring session a number of delegations, including my own spoke in favour of expert consideration of the system of verification of a nuclear test ban in all its aspects. From the organizational point of view that could be done relatively easily - for instance by expanding the mandate of the existing Group of Seismic Experts. There are several proposals on verification that could be studied by the experts, including document CD/756 of which Bulgaria is a co-author, and CD/902, tabled recently by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic. To begin with the experts could elaborate on the structure of the future verification system.

We believe that with realism and readiness for work we could also move forward on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are well aware of the arguments of those who, for the moment, are not ready to embark on immediate negotiations due to what they perceive as the complexity of the matters involved, the lack of clarity on key terms, the need to define the precise scope of the existing legal régime, etc. We agree to discuss everything that will enable us to carry out the task formulated under item 5 of our agenda. We could start with the identification of the subjects that every delegation considers it necessary to be clarified, and then try to find exhaustive answers to all of them.

Some member States are not ready at this stage to subscribe to comprehensive solutions aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Let us then start concrete work in those fields where a common approach could be worked out - for instance, on some confidence-building measures in space. In this connection, we agree with the opinion expressed by Ambassador Vajnar of Czechoslovakia that "it might be useful if, during the summer session, the three items forming the programme of work were not treated in a general and all-embracing way, but the Ad hoc Committee instead concentrated its attention on some issues of wider interest. In full accordance with the three-layer pattern of the programme of work, the Ad hoc Committee could first identify clearly the nature of these issues or an issue, then consider to what extent they are or are not already treated within the existing legal régime and, finally, examine how the existing relevant proposals could be implemented most effectively".

Bulgaria has participated in the activities of the Conference on Disarmament since its inception. We have seen all the ups and downs in the work of this multilateral negotiating body, which has significant results to

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

its credit. Against this background we cannot but be alarmed that over the past decade the Conference has been unable to produce a single multilateral agreement. It is as though a vicious circle has been created.

> "For years" - stated Mr. Petar Mladenov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in this hall last year - "it was alleged that the Conference was not in a position to conduct disarmament negotiations because of the confrontation between the USSR and the United States, between East and West. Today there are those who maintain that it cannot fulfil its role in this field since intensive Soviet-American talks are under way. If the first allegation had some logic to it, we feel the second thesis is totally biased."

Can one regard as unbiased the thesis rightly criticized by Ambassador Azambuja in his statement of 13 June, to the effect that "multilateral and bilateral negotiations on a CTB are mutually exclusive, whatever their time frame, and thus that the CD should not exercise its negotiating prerogatives in dealing with its agenda item 1"? Can one regard as unbiased the thesis that the Conference should confine itself to mere study of item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", since bilateral negotiations are going on? My delegation is of the opinion that bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations can and should be complementary options. It is necessary to find ways and means of harmonizing them. It is not only politically wrong, but also politically dangerous, to let the credibility of the CD slip away.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Bojilov, for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

There are no more speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to make a statement? It seems not, so I shall close the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 29 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.